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22 June 1981

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INTER-ARAB AFFAIRS

PLO OFFICIAL INTERVIEWED ON CURRENT PALESTINIAN AFFAIRS

JN310515 (Clandestine) Voice of Palestine in Arabic 1758 GMT 30 May 81

[Undated interview granted to Voice of Palestine by Yasir 'Abd Rabbuh, member of the PLO Executive Committee and head of the PLO's Information and Culture Department--recorded]

[Text] [Question] Brothers: We have with us now Comrade Yasir 'Abd Rabbuh, member of the PLO Executive Committee and head of the Information and Culture Department, who will talk to us about two major subjects: firstly, the second conference of the Democratic Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine [DPFLP], which concluded its work yesterday, and secondly, the current political stand, which can be approached through the Zionist attacks against some regions in the south, most prominent among them, of course, the air raid against the Al-Na'imah and Al-Damur regions. Comrade Yasir: We first of all greet the DPFLP for the results of its second conference and hope you will give us a full summary of the results of this conference.

[Answer] In fact, we have agreed to call the second DPFLP conference the unity conference. The conference's political results were a consolidation of the front's political, ideological and organizational unity. These results stipulated the need to continue struggling to consolidate the unity of the ranks of our Palestinian people and the PLO with all its struggling national groups and forces inside and outside the occupied territory. It is a unity conference because it stressed the decisions adopted by the Palestine National Council [PNC] on the need to revive and establish the Palestinian National Front in the occupied territory with a view to unifying the potentials of our people with all their factions within the context of a unified militant framework in order to confront the occupying enemy's measures. It is also a unity conference because it emphasized that, under the current circumstances of the Arab National Liberation Movement, struggle for the building of a unified Arab national front to counter the comprehensive and radical imperialist onslaught against the Arab peoples' interests is a prerequisite for our Arab peoples which will enable them to overcome and repulse this onslaught.

It is a unity conference because it asserted that the PLO, the Palestinian revolution and all the forces of Arab liberation forces can, depending on the principled and firm alliance with world progressive and liberation forces,

headed by the Soviet Union, confront all the attempts by U.S. imperialism and the Camp David partners to dominate the region and subjugate it. By the joint struggle of all these parties the door can actually be reopened for seizure of our people's legitimate national rights, led by their right to repatriation, self-determination and the establishment of an independent state.

The second DPFLP conference has stressed that the PLO's phased program during the past years has formed the foundation of all the political victories and gains achieved by the PLO and our Palestinian people on all levels. On the basis of this program, it was possible to unify all our people's forces under the PLO's leadership and it was also possible to achieve all the political victories on the Arab and international levels. By continued adherence to this program in order to ensure our people's rights to repatriation and an independent state, the PLO can overcome the difficult circumstances of our Palestinian struggle at this stage. Within this context, the second DPFLP conference stressed what was decided by the PNC when it welcomed Comrade Brezhnev's initiative on a collective solution in the Middle East, chiefly based on the liberation of all the occupied Arab territories and the guarantee of our people's inalienable rights, particularly their right to establish an independent state under the PLO.

In fact, we consider that the political results adopted by the conference are in harmony with the stand of the national forces which are struggling within the framework of the PLO. Thus, our understanding of the conference is that it is a conference on a strong and clear unity. The participation of brother Abu 'Ammar [Yasir 'Arafat] and that of the Palestinian leaderships in the final meeting of the second conference, the emphasis put on the identity of stand and the support for the resolutions indicate that the Palestinian revolution, with all its trends and factions, has united politically on the basis of a cohesive, unified national program, unified militant national objectives and within a unified, militant national framework, that of the PLO.

The resolutions of the second national conference were largely devoted to the situation in the Arab region. The resolutions dealt with the latest developments in the Arab situation, particularly the escalation of the U.S.-imperialist onslaught through the establishment of military bases and deployment of the rapid deployment forces in several areas in the Gulf, the [Arabian] Peninsula and the Red Sea. All this represents the other side of the Camp David scheme which the United States began 2 years ago by trying to liquidate the Palestinian cause and Arab rights in the Zionist enemy's interest. The struggle against the presence and hegemony of U.S. imperialism is a struggle waged by the group of national Arab forces of liberation.

The conference had stressed that the PLO's Arab role, in its capacity as part of the national Arab liberation movement which is struggling against imperialism, Zionism and the agent reactionary forces, dictates the consolidation of the ranks of the front of steadfastness and confrontation and the unity of the group of Arab nationalist and progressive forces within the framework of a broader front that will struggle against U.S. hegemony, against the imperialist

presence and military bases and against the Camp David agreements. The central issue of the current Arab struggle is to foil the Camp David course and agreements, whether these agreements are manifested through the Camp David schemes to liquidate the Palestinian cause or through the expansion of the scope of U.S. imperialist hegemony and control over some areas in the peninsula and the Gulf. The consistent slogan raised by our Arab people, which says that the Arabs' oil is the property of the Arabs, has been the slogan which was reiterated by the second DPFLP conference. This slogan reaffirms the fact that the Arabs' oil must be used for the Arabs' cause of liberation and for repulsing this onslaught to which our region is currently being subjected on more than one level and in more than one country.

On the international level, we have stressed that the role of the PLO, in its capacity as part of the international liberation movement and proceeding from the premise of this position, consists of strengthening relations with all the national liberation movements and all the progressive and democratic forces in the world. The broadening of the framework of recognition of the PLO, and the consolidation of its position in the world, should also be the duty and basic task of all the Palestinian forces which are struggling within the framework of the PLO.

Certainly, we call for exploiting any differences within the ranks of the imperialist camp to secure recognition of the PLO. However, we make a clear distinction between the attempts at maneuvering and deceiving made by certain imperialist countries and our own efforts to benefit from differences between these imperialist countries. Therefore, we have stressed that any international initiative or stand will be considered to be positive if it recognizes the PLO as the sole legitimate representative of the Palestinian people and recognizes all our rights, especially our right to establish our independent states, and rejects the Camp David accords as the framework for a settlement in our region. [several words indistinct] the PLO and the independent state. Other than that, we must point out political tricks and maneuvering which only aim at brainwashing and deceiving our people and Arab nation in general.

[Question] It is clearly obvious from what Comrade Yasir has said that the results of the second conference of the DPFLP truly represent complete and integral commitment to the resolutions of the Palestine National Council, which confirms to us that our political life is harmonious with our general policy on various issues and events.

[Answer] Certainly.

[Question] Let us now move to another topic, which is the current political situation. We, as politicians, view the current political situation from our own Palestinian angle. In other words, we are experiencing a crisis in this region known as the missile crisis and sometimes as the heights crisis or Lebanese crisis. But, despite the Western news media's optimism over the Philip Habib mission, the splitting of the issue in the region and the possibilities of finding solutions to the different components of this issue, U.S.-Israeli planes have strafed Palestinian areas in Al-Na'imah and Al-Damur



and as well as other areas in southern Lebanon. All this has been accompanied by heavy artillery and rocket shelling of many areas in the south. Moreover, enemy leaders have said that they have told Philip Habib that they would carry out these operations. Yet, a spokesman for the White House or the State Department has said that what has happened does not constitute a violation of or deviation from the scenario of what is now termed the settlement of the missile issue or the Lebanese crisis. In light of these things, we would like to hear the opinion of Comrade Yasir on the current political situation.

[Answer] Philip Habib has failed in his mission after he tried by various means in the past few weeks to impose Israel's conditions on Syria in order to make it withdraw its missiles and reserve Lebanese air space for Israeli belligerency and continued aggression against the Lebanese and Palestinian peoples. All indications show that Philip Habib has completely failed in making a deal serving Israel's interests and aggressive line. Syria has rejected these conditions. The Arab foreign ministers meetings in Tunis have resulted in a unanimous Arab rejection of these conditions. All the Arab nationalist forces have declared their solidarity with the Palestinian revolution, the Lebanese nationalist movement and Syria in this battle. Furthermore, the USSR has expressed in decisive language its solidarity with the tripartite steadfastness front--the Palestinian revolution, Syria and the Lebanese [word indistinct] movement. The USSR has also placed all its resources at the disposal of the forces confronting Israeli aggression and U.S. blackmail.

Philip Habib's failure to secure a political solution meeting Israel's demands has prompted him to return and end his shuttle mission. In the meantime, U.S. strategists have given Israel the green light to wage a new campaign of aggression against Palestinian and Lebanese positions, hoping that they would achieve by aggressive military means what they could not achieve by means of pressure and political blackmail. This explains Israel's military operations over the past 2 days. It was the U.S. Pentagon that issued the orders to the Israeli planes to wage their attacks on Palestinian and Lebanese positions. The aim is to weaken Palestinian and Lebanese national resistance and prove the failure of the Arab deterrent forces, especially the Syrian forces, to confront the Israeli aggression. The strategists hope that this situation will necessitate the return of Philip Habib to exploit the results of the Israeli military aggression to try to enforce the same old conditions; namely, the withdrawal of the missiles.

We are fully aware of the fact, as has been established by Philip Habib's mission, that Israel cannot, unilaterally and without U.S. consent, continue its aggression. It is clear now that the U.S. decision is to expand the scope of aggression. We believe that through the solidarity of the Palestinian revolution, the Lebanese nationalist movement and fraternal Syria we can confront such aggression and all the forms of political and military pressure to which we may be strongly subjected in the next few weeks.

We also believe that it is the responsibility of the Arab states, which met in Tunis and adopted decisions, to back the Palestinian revolution and Syria in confronting any Zionist aggression, especially now that it has been established

that the Zionist aggression is encouraged by the United States. It is the duty of all the Arab states to work to implement the Tunis conference resolutions, especially with regard to firmly confronting U.S. policy.

Deterring Israeli aggression must essentially begin by deterring U.S. policy in our region. The Arab countries, which have the economic and oil weapons and all possibilities of political and material pressure can, if they are indeed serious and determined to carry out the Tunis conference resolutions, participate in facing this aggression and the escalation which we might face in the next few weeks.

We believe that the United States wants to break up the Arab steadfastness front. The breakup of this front in Lebanon would open the doors before imperialism and Zionism to do what they like in the entire region. Every Arab country wanting to defend itself against imperialism and Zionism must know that its first and last line of defense is in Lebanon and in the national steadfastness battle we are now waging.

As expected, Philip Habib will return to the region after a short period. He wants to return to collect the fruits of the Israeli aggression to which we are currently being subjected as well as those of the political interventions, maneuvers and covert and overt pressures that some parties in the region are carrying out to influence the stand of national steadfastness in Lebanon and Syria. We, however, believe that our firm stand, the firm Syrian stand and its commitment to the course that it has announced, our solidarity and our alliance with the Soviet Union will constitute basic conditions for confrontation in the current circumstances. We also believe that, the more we strengthen our Palestinian, Lebanese and Syrian national alliance and our alliance with the Soviet Union, the more we shall be capable of building a strong barrier against the second stage of Philip Habib's mission, in its political and aggressive military aspects, as is apparent through the Zionist enemy raids against us.

A final point which I would like to stress is that we believe that the Arab front of steadfastness, as Abu 'Ammar stated yesterday, has begun to assume a serious role in the struggle that is waging against the Zionist aggression. The martyrs who fell yesterday are martyrs of the Arab front of steadfastness. The role of the Arab front of steadfastness is that of any Arab liberation movement that defends its positions. This is evident in the extent of its participation in the struggle that is currently being waged in the Lebanese arena. This struggle intensifies the battle in the area between the forces of national liberation and its imperialist, Zionist enemies and their agents.

[Question] There is no doubt that we are living a stage which we have promised ourselves and the Arab masses. It is a period of upsurge in this region against U.S. imperialism, the Zionist enemy and their agents. There are also important indications that show that the front of steadfastness and confrontation and, more specifically, its militant vanguards, the Palestinian revolution, the Lebanese nationalist forces and Syria, can fill the vacuum that resulted from Egypt's temporary removal from the Arab arena or from the Arab-Israeli dispute. We believe that this is a good chance to continue with our struggle and achieve good results on the level of our national struggle and battle. Our thanks to Comrade Yasir 'Abd Rabbuh for this interview and we hope that other interviews will be held later.



FATAH MEMBERS DISCUSS RESPONSIBILITY FOR NITTEL KILLING

AU271338 Vienna PROFIL in German Issue No 21, 25 May 81 pp 12, 13

[Renate Possarnig talk in Damascus with members of the Fatah Revolutionary Committee: "We Will Kill Kreisky Too"--date not given]

[Text] In Damascus Renate Possarnig spoke with three members of the Fatah Revolutionary Committee [Revolutionskomitee]: (Mariam), (Abu Elias) and (Abd al-Rahman).

PROFIL: Why did you kill Heinz Nittel?

Revolutionary Committee: The reasons which made us execute this man are the following: He has engaged in activities against the Palestinians in Vienna. Second, he has engaged in espionage against the Palestinians. Third, he has assumed the role of a middleman between certain persons of the PLO leadership and the Zionists. Nittel has arranged meetings in and outside Vienna. We consider this an aggressive act.

PROFIL: The claims you are voicing here are not known in Austria. Even I have never heard of these activities imputed to Nittel. What are the sources of your information?

Revolutionary Committee: We are better informed because we have an informer in Vienna who followed Nittel's every step.

PROFIL: Is this the Austrian who also killed Nittel?

Revolutionary Committee: No, if we want to kill somebody we do it ourselves. The person who did it is no longer in Vienna. He only came to Vienna to kill Nittel and is no longer in Vienna.

PROFIL: After all, Heinz Nittel was not a very important political person. There are politicians in the world and in Austria who are more important.

Revolutionary Committee: Nittel was certainly not very important to you Austrians. As far as we are concerned, however, the role he was playing was very significant. Nittel was an important man because he was the head of the Austrian-Israeli Society. Spies are always recognized as having been

major personalities after they are executed. That is why this man is now, after he has been shot, more important than while he was alive. The fact that Kreisky canceled the May Day festivities because of Nittel's death is proof for us of how important Nittel was.

PROFIL: Where did the order to kill Nittel come from? Did the order come from Baghdad, from your chief Abu Nidal?

Revolutionary Committee: We do not receive orders from anybody, neither from Damascus nor from Baghdad, because our central leadership is composed of members from many countries. It is wrong to assume that our people reside only in Damascus or Baghdad. In our organization there is no single person who issues orders. It is our collective leadership that issues orders. Our leadership is in Beirut, Damascus, Amman, Baghdad, also in Jerusalem and Nablus, but all this is very secret. We are all in the underground. On the very same day that we killed Nittel in Vienna, we also killed a Zionist in Jerusalem and wounded another five. The Israelis have stolen our land and we will fight for it, even if it takes 100 years.

PROFIL: And yet your deed was not only cruel but also senseless.

Revolutionary Committee: No, it is not, because our deed is also a warning to Kreisky. If he does not abandon his plots against the Palestinian people we will kill him too. We enjoin him to hand over to us all his confidential negotiation papers and documents that are connected with our people. He can be sure to live only if he hands over the papers.

PROFIL: Where is Federal Chancellor Kreisky supposed to hand over these papers? You live in the underground and your address is secret. How is Kreisky supposed to contact you?

Revolutionary Committee: There is an Austrian Embassy in Damascus. It would be no problem for this embassy to find our address. It can call up our bureau.

PROFIL: Do you expect Kreisky to ask the Syrian Government about your address?

Revolutionary Committee: Yes.

PROFIL: There are many people who seriously doubt that you have committed this deed. Your leaflet appeared at the Austrian Embassy 4 days after the assassination. We in Austria are under the impression that you have taken this deed upon yourselves, that you are "bragging" about it, because your organization has not been heard of for so long.

Revolutionary Committee: Friday was a holiday. On Saturday and Sunday there was nobody at the embassy. On the third day after the execution we wanted to take the leaflet to the consulate general but it was closed. That is why you only got it on the fourth day. Kreisky should not interfere in our affairs, they are none of his business. We are determined to take action against him too.

PROFIL: What does this mean?

Revolutionary Committee: It means that we will kill Kreisky too if he does not stop his mediation activities between Israel and the PLO.

PROFIL: Who supports you, in effect? Who gives you money and weapons?

Revolutionary Committee: Our people, tradesmen and businessmen.

PROFIL: What is your ideological position?

Revolutionary Committee: We are against the United States. The Soviet Union is our friend because it stands at our side, even if it does not support us directly. Our money and our weapons do not come from the Soviet Union.

PROFIL: How about the weapon used in the killing, it was a Soviet product?

Revolutionary Committee: Such weapons can be bought anywhere on the free market.

PROFIL: Do you really believe you can free Palestine by committing such assassinations?

Revolutionary Committee: No, we do not believe so. But we can put an end to such machinations (of the kind perpetrated by Nittel). Had we not been assassinating people Yasi- 'Arafat would have long ago gone to Jerusalem, just as Al-Sadat did. When the right moment comes we will kill him too. We must kill him because it is we who are the true Fatah. It is our main task to prevent treason.

CSO: 4320/2

## INTER-ARAB AFFAIRS

### BRIEFS

**ASSISTING PALESTINIAN DETAINEES**--Reports from the occupied homeland mention that four Palestinian Fedayeen, the heroes of the Hebron operation, are threatened with death as a result of the torture to which they are being subjected in their solitary confinement. The International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) must assume a basic role in this issue and on the situation of the detainees in general. The Palestinian and Arab masses were surprised at the reports that have been disseminated inside the occupied territories that the ICRC intends to reduce its assistance to the Palestinian detainees and its activities there. Let us all, whether inside or outside the occupied homeland, struggle to defend the heroes of the Hebron operation and confront the Zionist terrorism and its Nazi practices. [Excerpts] [JN201803 (Clandestine) Voice of Palestine in Arabic 1349 GMT 20 May 81]

**FLO OFFICIAL PRAISES SOVIETS**--Brother Majid Abu Sharar, Fatah Central Committee member, has praised the prominent and effective role played by the Soviet Union, honest ally of our Palestinian people and Arab nation, through its firm stand in support of Lebanon's unity, freedom and security as well as through the various forms of aid extended to us, fraternal Syria and all factions and forces of Arab liberation. This was contained in a message Brother Abu Sharar sent to Comrade Barabash, chairman of the Soviet Committee of Friendship and Solidarity With the Arab Peoples of Palestine on the occasion of a celebration held by the committee. Brother Abu Sharar warmly welcomed President Brezhnev's speech on the anniversary marking the establishment of the Socialist Republic of Georgia. He stressed that what was contained in the message [as heard] as well as the proposals stated before the 26th congress have been warmly welcomed by our Palestinian people. These proposals, he said, attest unequivocally to the Soviet Union's sincerity in supporting our just causes and in confronting the imperialist-Zionist plots in our region based on its desire to maintain peace. [Text] [JN232134 (Clandestine) Voice of Palestine in Arabic 1505 GMT 23 May 81]

**OIL SUPPLIES**--In this current crisis, the destiny of war and peace in the Arab countries is in the hands of Syria and the Palestinian revolution. The U.S. imperialists should hear that the oil wells will not flow if the fires of the aggressive Israeli war are set ablaze against the forces of the Palestinian revolution, and Lebanese National Movement and Syria in Al-Biqa' and southern Lebanon. We clearly state this. Imperialism will discover that this is not a threat made in a vacuum and, yes, it will be implemented by all the strugglers in our Arab region, foremost of them being the Palestinian revolution. [applause] [Speech by DPFLP leader Nayif Hawatimah] [Excerpts] [JN292008 (Clandestine) Voice of Palestine in Arabic 1824 GMT 29 May 81]

# DIFFERENCES AMONG SECULAR OPPOSITION GROUPS DISCUSSED

Rome L'UMANITA in Italian 30 May 81 p 6

[Article No 6 in a series by Tonino Tani]

[Text] Other than the Islamic movements in Afghanistan there are many secular groups, also including the socialists and Maoists, that are opposing the Soviets fiercely.

Despite their common dislike of the Soviet Union and their sympathy for the Moslem religion, the major Islamic groups have not succeeded in building a solid front. One of the few attempts to do this is represented by the creation of the Islamic Liberation Front at the end of January 1980 by the six big groups based in Pakistan. Rasul Sayyef was named president of this new alliance, but shortly afterward, Hekmatyar withdrew. Due to the persistence of major causes of attrition of members, it cannot be foreseen how long the other members will stay in the front.

The causes of this disunity in the ranks of the Afghan opposition to the Soviets are numerous. Beside the conflicts of personality, there are disagreements about the leaders, the role to give to the former king and the top officials, and relations with the other politicians and other countries.

Hekmatyar, as well as Gailani, boast about being the leader with the greatest number of followers. Of course, the group that has the best and most arms is that of Hekmatyar, but he apparently is unwilling to share his military equipment with others if he is not named chief of the alliance. His ambitions differ particularly from those of Gailani, Mojaddedi and Nabi. For their part, Rabbani and Khalis would vote to elect Hekmatyar.

From the ideological point of view, the group of Gailani is the most liberal, while the groups headed by Mojaddedi, Nabi, Rabbani and Khalis are largely conservative. For his part, Hekmatyar is the leader who is more orthodox in religious matters. Actually the main aim of Hekmatyar is to set up an Islamic republic in Afghanistan, taking the one in Iran as a model. He is opposed to any role for the royal family, whether in the war against the Soviets or in a future Afghan government. The reason for this rejection is the certainty that the former king, Zahir Shah, is at least partly responsible for the present crisis in the country.



The other three groups have not expressed approval of a future Afghan government; in fact, their main purpose is to drive the Soviets out of Afghanistan. Nevertheless, it is well known that Gailani favors a political role for the former monarchy in a future Afghanistan. Although they do not oppose this idea in principle, Mojaddedi and Nabi have stated repeatedly that they are not fighting in behalf of the royal family.

The differences of the various leaders are noteworthy regarding relations with foreign powers and groups. Hekmatyar favors a foreign stand by all the world's Islamic forces, and this point of view is shared by Rabbani and Khalis as well.

On the other hand, Gailani does not object to aid from non-Moslem countries; actually, he has repeatedly called on the Western powers requesting them to support the Afghan partisans in their struggle.

While the groups based in Afghanistan get remarkable coverage by the international press, most of the fighters living in Afghanistan are members of tribes and sectarian groups, armed poorly, and have rather weak ties with the groups in Pakistan and Iran. It is possible that new leaders will emerge from the hardships of battles inside the country. These internal groups are characterized by a variety of ethnic background. The Pushtun, which is the dominant group, belong to the Waziri, Momand, and Mengals tribes of eastern Afghanistan. Other ethnic groups that have announced their active participation are, among others, the Nuristani, Tajik and Hazarah of central Afghanistan. The Hazarahs are Shi'ites and make up something like 10 percent of the population.

The noteworthy fact is that the successes of the non-Pushtun groups have introduced a new element into the Afghan political scene.

In effect, the various tribal and ethnic groups of Afghanistan have traditionally always had suspicions about the central government, in particular if it intended to centralize the country. The Pashtuns have largely dominated Afghan politics by virtue of their superior military ability; (in reality, it was this group that dominated the armed forces). Nevertheless, the recent disorders in Afghanistan have encouraged the establishing of new centers of power; the importance of these centers should be given due account by any Afghan government. The Hazarah, Tajik and Nuristani groups have been striving for a long time to obtain a federated political system that would permit the various regions to get more internal autonomy. Disagreement on this aspiration would very likely lead to a conflict among the various groups.

CSO: 4628/1



IRAN

# CLANDESTINE RADIO COMMENTS ON SHARI'ATMADARI'S HEALTH

## Release Asked

NC041855 (Clandestine) Radio Iran in Persian to Iran 1330 GMT 4 Jun 81

[Text] Reports from Qom indicate that Ayatollah Shari'Atmadari is ill and that Ruhollah Khomeyni has not agreed to his transfer to a well-equipped hospital or to an area other than Qom where the summer is more mild. Doctors face many difficulties in visiting Ayatollah Shari'Atmadari's residence and Khomeyni's revolutionary guards create numerous problems for the Ayatollah's special doctor.

Ayatollah Shari 'Atmadari's supporters intend to meet in the Tabriz Bazaar on Monday morning, 8 June, in order to demand his freedom. The people of Azerbaijan insist that the Ayatollah's arrest, which has lasted 18 months, should be ended, especially now that he is ill.

Some time ago the Ayatollah's recorded message in the Azeri language was distributed in Azerbaijan. In this short message the Ayatollah became carried away and cried when speaking about the situation in the country and his own condition.

Meanwhile, reports from Tabriz indicate that the bazaaris there intend to close their shops on Monday, 8 June, in protest over the continued arrest of Ayatollah Shari 'Atmadari. The same report states that the Ayatollah's followers throughout Azerbaijan will go to Tabriz to participate in the Monday demonstrations.

## Protest Meeting Planned

NC051530 (Clandestine) Radio Iran in Persian to Iran 1330 GMT 5 Jun 81

[Text] Reports received from Qom speak of the illness of Ayatollah Shari'Atmadari who has been suffering from a fever and side ache for the past few days. It is said that his illness is probably [word indistinct] which is usually accompanied by severe pain and often caused by harsh conditions and pressure on the nervous system. Because of the ill treatment shown by Khomeyni's mercenary guards and the unsatisfactory condition created around the Ayatollah's residence by the hooligans, the physical condition of Ayatollah Shari'Atmadari is, unfortunately, deteriorating.

Since Khomeyni's criminal clique prevents the Ayatollah's private doctor from visiting him, another person who has been selected to treat him is neither expressing views nor revealing facts. Therefore, there is no exact information concerning the details of the Ayatollah's condition. Ayatollah Shari'Atmadari has been quoted as saying: I wish to spend the rest of my life in Azerbaijan among the people of Azerbaijan. The same sources said that they exerted great efforts to gain permission for Ayatollah Shari'Atmadari's transfer to Tabriz, but Khomeyni, displaying rancour and spite toward a person who saved his abominable life, has not agreed to let the Ayatollah go.

Meanwhile, reports from Tabriz indicate that a statement issued by the Islamic Republic Party of the Muslim People (Hezb-e Jomhuri-ye Eslami-ye Khalq-e Mosalman) has been distributed in that city. The party has called on all heroic Azerbaijanians to participate in a meeting that has been planned for Monday morning, 8 June, at the Tabriz Bazaar and to call in unison for the release of Ayatollah Shari'Atmadari and his transfer from Qom to Tabriz.

CSO: 4640/5

**GUERRILLAS PRAISE CUBANS FIGHTING IN AFGHANISTAN**

Quetta BALUCHISTAN TIMES in English 25 May 81 p 4

[Text] London, May 24: The reports about Cuba's soldiers' presence in Afghanistan and their participation in the war against Mujahideen have been confirmed.

An Afghan guerrilla who faced Cubans in an encounter, remarked, "They are less coward than Soviets and more trained than them."

The Harkat-i-Inqilab-i-Islam central office in Peshawar told AGENCY AFGHAN PRESS that the early last week a bloody encounter took place at Musai in Lagar province. There were about 200 Cuban soldiers who participated in the fighting, out of which more than 30 were killed. [as published]

Further details about the bloody encounter reveal that the Soviets had first time used more than 20 trained dogs in the war who recovered the arms of the killed Soviet soldiers and took them to the Soviet forces' position. The guerrillas who saw the 20 dogs comment that they were more active and ready than the soldiers of invasion forces who fight in a drunken state. [as published]

A report from Kabul says that Mujahideen, in an operation launched on the Ministry of Justice killed the Vice Chairman of the Department of Islamic Courts. On May 7, six Afghan Mujahids impersonating as Afghan army soldiers, by wearing their uniforms, entered the Department. They wanted to arrest the Chairman of the Department Mr Saeed Afghani, but he was not present at the moment.

The Mujahids kidnapped the Vice Chairman, put him in a vehicle and took to "Company" a place in the Paghman valley. [as published] The Mujahideen's Islamic Court put the Vice Chairman on trial. Later he was executed.

The Department of Islamic Courts was established by Babrak Karmal and to run the organisation services of 50 Ulema who were supporters of administration were sought. They are being given handsome salaries with lot of other benefits and amenities--AAP.

CSO: 4600

## IRAN

### IMPACT OF UNIVERSITIES CLOSURE REPORTED BY PRESIDENTIAL COMMISSION

Tehran ENQELAB-E ESLAMI in Persian 17 May 81 p 8

[Article: "The Report of the Commission on Evaluating the Social Impact of the Closure of Universities and Colleges"]

[Text] In the seminar for the investigation of the crisis of the universities and colleges in the Office for Coordination of the People's Cooperation with the President

#### 1. The Society

a. The majority of Iranian society did not severely react to the closure of the universities because of the separateness and alienation of the universities from the society as a whole and because of some of the political games and deceptions.

b. But the same people were not indifferent to the issue and to the extent that the institutions had ties with the whole society they showed various reactions.

c. Because of their social awareness, the society considered the closure of the universities a social shortcoming and recognized it as a sign of disrespect for knowledge and the university. And, unfortunately, after the universities reopen and resume operations, the harm will still remain a result of this devaluation.

d. The closure of the universities, as one of the centers for social thought, harmed the progress of the revolution and the consolidation of the regime of the Islamic Republic of Iran, deprived the people's movement of a social and intellectual organization, and "alienated" this institution, which was potentially fruitful in the revolutionary society.

e. The closure of the universities greatly harmed the right of the rule of the people to reap the gains of the revolution, since they

could have, through discussions on the functions of decision-making and executive institutions, become centers of public thought.

Unfortunately, because of the limitations imposed on academic efforts dictatorship and violence expanded and eliminated thinking and exchanges of opinion.

f. The closure of the universities has not only brought about disrespect for and despair to the academics but, by keeping educational thinkers out of the decision-making process, by humiliating individuals and social groups, and by refusing to call on them to contribute to building a new educational system, the esteem granted universities was also destroyed and no respect remained.

g. Politically motivated statements which separate science and expertise from piety and faith have caused a misunderstanding in the society. As a result, it is supposed that they negate one another. Consequently, respect for science has been shattered and at the same time, it is thought that turning to science is harmful to religious beliefs. The truth is that the unity of science and piety, even their inseparability, brings continuity to scientific creativity and piety in the society.

## 2. Classes and the Family

a. The Iranian universities were gradually taking in the children of middle and poor classes of the society and in a sense would have been part of the "downtrodden" of the country. These social strata were greatly harmed by the closure of the universities since the comfortable classes had been sending their children abroad to be educated from the very beginning.

b. The middle and even the poor classes of the society, having been burdened with deprivation, are trying nevertheless to send their children abroad, hoping that they can continue their education by doing odd jobs.

c. Presently, the number of Iranian students, in spite of all the monetary exchange and economic difficulties, is the highest in proportion to the population of Iran in Korea, the Philippines, New Zealand, Australia, Thailand, India, Pakistan, Europe, the United States, and other countries, and disproportionate to the population of the country on the third or fourth level [as published]. This large group which the previous and present regimes have caused to go abroad will eventually remain out of touch with the beliefs of the Iranian culture and will be, for the most part, absorbed by the imperialistic system. This will degrade the dignity of the revolution and will give a bad name to our newfound Islamic Republic in the Islamic world, because in a dynamic Islamic system it is expected



that most of the students will return home to study, do research, and serve in their own country.

d. The closure of the universities has confronted Iranian families with distress and anxiety over the future of their children. The parents who, on the one hand, feel responsible are unable, on the other, to do their duty. Therefore, on top of the psychological harm they have suffered, they have come to think less favorably of the Islamic revolution.

e. The closure of the universities will also have ill effects on the pre-university generation. High school students also find themselves in a blind alley, as if a part of their lives has been removed leaving the future stagnant. This group, too, finds itself confronted in high schools with new problems because of the educational and administrative operators. But even if they succeed in solving them, they still do not see a bright future ahead. Therefore, educational motivation is also harmed.

### 3. Services

The closure of the universities has harmed certain services, including health, medical, and social aid, and scientific, technological, building, and agricultural "construction." Because experts, specialists, and last-year students have been frightened away from the work place, certain disorders have resulted throughout the society, especially among the poor, "downtrodden" strata. And when the universities reopen, this will take its toll for many years to come. And the longer the reopening and reconstruction is delayed, the more the harm will undoubtedly increase.

The impact of the closure of the universities on health services is quite evident and tangible. Considering the present population of the country (36 million), and the minimal need of one physician per thousand, the society needs 36,000 doctors.

However, with the reduction in the number of physicians due to the many who have left the country, the present number of doctors is now 14,000, who must bear the burden of supplying health services throughout the country. In the past, the Iranian medical schools had only 690 graduates, which, of course, did not correspond with the growth in the country's population. With the closure of the universities, this insignificant number, which was at least of some help in the health services, has been eliminated.

### 4. The Professors

a. The closure of the universities, the humiliation and dismissal of some of the professors, and the purging of the faculty on the basis of ideologies or pure malice have disturbed the economic, social, family, and psychological life of many of the individuals



of this intelligent stratum of society. At a time when the Islamic Republic of Iran needed thought and innovation, the thinkers and innovators were dismissed from the field of creativity and construction. This action not only disappointed them but chained them like new "slaves" in a society without an identity.

b. A group of these enslaved people of the monopolizing system were unfortunately able to leave their homeland and put their knowledge, experience, and love of research at the disposal of foreigners, some even cooperating pre-meditatedly, like mercenaries, with them, and some began to flatter hypocritically, all of which could destroy the value system of the Islamic Republic. It must also be mentioned that a number of them truthfully have cooperated scientifically and continue their efforts steadfastly.

c. The historical respect for professors, who had held the highest esteem in our Islamic society, was destroyed. The past dictatorial regime harmed this social respect in one way and the present regime does so in another. Consequently, professors, who never had economic motivations, nor job security, have lost their previous motivation. Hence, the love of teaching, learning, and knowledge have decreased. This has prevented our society, from a socio-cultural standpoint, from achieving the "open civilization" which is a legacy of the glorious era of the expansion of Iranian Islamic culture and the goal of the glorious revolution.

d. Insecurity, disappointment, and despair, which prevail among the faculties of the universities in the country, have also cast their shadow over the lives of the workers and employees of the universities and have placed them in the same distraught condition mentioned above.

## 5. Students and the Young Generation

### 5.1 Psychological

a. The young Iranian student, in light of the revolutionary excitement, clamor, and wrath, felt fervor for the movement and for construction. But after much struggle, he was forced into immobility and sterility as his enthusiasm and energy were in no way utilized. Consequently, forced silence and uselessness caused in him psychological dejection and despair.

b. The resulting psycho-social situation, due to the tyranny of the power monopolists, caused this social force to be drawn into anti-social behavior and gradually into drug addiction. As the time passes, these afflictions are becoming more significant and more dangerous.

c. The young people who, with much hope for an independent future in a free country, were finishing their educations and preparing themselves (even though obtaining a degree) to find proper jobs and to accept new responsibilities in their families and society not only found themselves farther away from their goals but even saw their goals disappear. Hence, they hold a sort of grudge against those who caused this injustice, which when accumulated will undoubtedly end in socio-political, psychological, and moral ailments.

## 5.2 Job Related

d. Students who had previously held particular revolutionary values and did not concern themselves with many of the material advantages which resulted from the economic system of the society gradually saw their inclinations for profit-seeking come to the fore and some of the unemployed are thus trying to make up for their shortcomings, a phenomenon which will retain its impact after the universities are reopened.

e. Many of the idle students find that they are not as responsible or committed as they were in the past. Those of them who belong to poor families engage in low-income activities such as selling cigarettes, tapes, etc. to busy themselves. Another group who enjoy financial and familial comfort are more easily drawn into various social maladies, or if they avoid such maladies because of their specific values, they find themselves burdening their families. This new realization of uselessness is psychologically and morally harmful to their consciences.

f. Because of lack of jobs, job insecurity, the impossibility of job changes, and indecisiveness in leaving their educations to find proper new employment, a certain kind of psychological malady prevails as a result of the distress of this group, which has harmed their independence, dignity, and desire to build a future for themselves.

## 5.3 Political

g. Students who found themselves free of the atmosphere of pressure and oppression in Iran and felt that they had a share in the freedom of the Islamic revolution now find their homes, which had truly been "strongholds of freedom," in a sense occupied, and find themselves confronted with a new threat. This unexpected condition had not only caused politico-social despair in them but also gradually discredited the meaning of struggle, liberation, and Islamic revolution in their views. This hopelessness and despair is most unpleasant for the future of the society, which the young generation will have the responsibility to manage.

h. The majority of the students were not politically or organizationally motivated in a precise ideological sense of the word. The closure of the universities and the harm it has done the students has pushed this majority towards either violent activism or indifferent reactionism, instead of making them politically positive and constructive individuals to serve the Islamic revolution. It will gradually change them into an anti-government generation or one which lacks the values of the Islamic revolution of Iran.

#### 5.4 Moral, Intellectual

i. After the Islamic revolution, the students found themselves returning to the cultural and social values of their own heritage and considered studying, research, discussions, and dialogues free of threats, fear, and ideological dictates as revolutionary values. The closure of the universities obstructed this intellectual movement of the young generation which would elevate and bring progress to the future Iranian society.

j. The closure of the universities and the spread of monopolizing attitudes will cause some of the students to become submissive as a result of economic, familial, and even mental indoctrination. And in pretending to be Islamic and revolutionary and through religious hypocrisy they will grow to be submissive, untrustworthy individuals. This change, which will be accompanied by the political impact of dependent political mercenaries, will undoubtedly harm the new-found Islamic Republic of Iran and its extremism will shake the pillars of the society more than the conspiracies of the "counterrevolution."

9593

CSO: 4906/277

AHVAZ ORGANIZATIONS VOICE SUPPORT FOR NEWSPAPER BAN

GF101614 [Editorial Report] Ahvaz Domestic Service in Persian at 1330 GMT on 10 June carried a number of announcements issued by named and unnamed organizations in Abadan, Mahshar, Agha Jari and Masjid Soleyman expressing support for the Islamic revolution prosecutor's decision to ban a number of newspapers. The announcer reads a statement issued by the Abadan Revolution Guard Corps and a number of other revolutionary organizations in which they express full support for Imam Khomeyni and declare that they will oppose the enemies of the Islamic revolution until the last drop of their blood. The statement says in part: "Renewing our pledge to the Imam of the nation, we express our full support for the Islamic revolution prosecutor's decision to ban the corrupt newspapers serving the foreigners."

A similar message expressing full support for Imam Khomeyni and the Islamic revolution prosecutor's decision has been issued by Abadan teachers.

The announcer then reports on a telegram that has been sent to Imam Khomeyni by the Mahshar Coordination Council for Islamic Propaganda. In the telegram, the council members praise Imam Khomeyni for his valuable guidance and express their readiness to follow the Imam's lines and decrees until the last drop of their blood. Their statement reads in part: "Imam, contrary to those who want peace and are arranging an imposed negotiation, we will continue fighting until Saddam's pro-American regime has fallen."

A similar message expressing support for the ban on the newspapers and expressing readiness to implement the Imam's decrees has been issued by the Islamic Society of Mahshahr Merchants. Messages of support have also been issued by various revolutionary organizations in Mahshar.

The announcer continues by reporting on a joint announcement that has been issued by various revolutionary organizations in Agha Jari. They have expressed their readiness to follow the Imam's line and their willingness to establish the Islamic revolution throughout the world. They have also expressed support for the ban on the newspapers.

The Ahvaz Radio announcer gives details of an announcement expressing support for the Velayat-e Faqih that has been issued by a revolutionary organization in Masjid Soleyman. The statement reads in part: "In approving the decisive action of the Islamic revolution prosecutor, we request that severe measures be taken against the pro-Western and pro-Eastern mercenaries." He concludes the report by citing a similar announcement that has been issued by employees of Masjid Soleyman Governorate. They have expressed support for the Imam of the nation and have praised all martyrs. The statement reads in part: "We request that severe action be taken against liberals, nationalists, capitalists, feudalists and all affiliated groups."



## CLANDESTINE RADIO CONDEMNS MOSCOW, TUDEH PARTY

NCU91623 (Clandestine) Radio Iran in Persian to Iran 1330 GMT 5 Jun 81

[Unattributed commentary]

[Excerpt] Many of our compatriots may have possibly forgotten the sinister role played by the Tudeh Party during the premiership of Dr Mohammad Mosaddeq against Iran's national movement, its obstructionism and how it undertook to implement Moscow's colonialist plans. This is the party that today, deeming it expedient, has altered its garb and--inspired by Radio Moscow's propaganda and serving the Kremlin's interests--has risen to praise Dr Mosaddeq. This party is constantly referring to his rule as "a national and anti-imperialist rule." This is the same seditious party that aimed all its efforts against the torchbearer of Iran's national movement and in whose various clandestine and overt publications Mosaddeq was described as "the bloodthirsty old hyena" and "the imperialist lackey," whose policies were condemned with ugly accusations. It is odd that this subservient party has now become a supporter of Dr Mosaddeq and is joining its voice with that of Radio Moscow to praise Dr Mosaddeq's national rule, thinking that the Iranian compatriots have forgotten. They think that the people have forgotten that one of the organs of this subservient party, the BE SU-YE AYANDEH newspaper, on 26 November 1950, when Dr Mosaddeq was struggling for the nationalization of the oil industry, wrote: The vindication of Iran's rights from the British Oil Company is something which cannot be fulfilled under present conditions.

The truth is that at that time the treacherous Tudeh Party had received orders from its source of inspiration to crush Mosaddeq and the Iranian nation's movement. Today it has been issued new orders--to praise the memory of Dr Mosaddeq and, at the same time, to walk in the Imam's bloody line.

CSO: 4640/5

## BRIEFS

**PARS OFFICIAL VISITS DARAB**--Mr Mohammad Nabi Habibi, the Pars governor general, arrived in Darab today to review the area's shortages. He attended a meeting in Darab Moaque that was attended by citizens, officials of revolutionary organizations and administrative officials. The town council representative spoke and summarized Darab's shortages, among which the main ones are water, electricity, hospital facilities and especially roads. He added that due to the lack of roads and other welfare facilities, most villagers have moved elsewhere. [Excerpts] [GF101625 Shiraz Domestic Service in Persian 1430 GMT 10 Jun 81]

**ANTIREGIME REPORTS**--Radio Iran has reported that Baluchi freedom fighters executed 12 of Khomeyni's revolution guards on Thursday (?in retaliation) for the execution of four Baluchi combatants [words indistinct] and (?threw their bodies) [word indistinct] near Zahedan. The Free Voice of Iran has reported in its news bulletin that young employees of the National Iranian Radio and Television Organization and of the Foreign Ministry [words indistinct]. The Free Voice of Iran has also reported that following the pressures imposed by heroic Azerbaijani combatants, the siege on Ayatollah Shari 'Atmadari's house by Khomeyni's regime was lifted. [Text] [NC101601 (Clandestine) Voice of Iran in Persian 1803 GMT 9 Jun 81]

**DPRK MEDICAL AID**--According to the Central News Unit, the North Korean ambassador in Tehran this afternoon met and conferred with Mr Musa Kalantari, the minister of roads and transport, at the ministry building. During this meeting they talked and exchanged views on various issues of mutual interest between the two countries, particularly as regards roads, railways and ports. It was agreed that a delegation from North Korea should visit Iran. During this meeting the North Korean ambassador announced his country's readiness to give medical help to Iranian self-sacrificing combatants in the Iraqi imposed war upon Iran, and expressed hope that his cooperation would strengthen friendship between the two countries. The minister of roads and transport expressed thanks for the offer of cooperation by the North Korean Government and reiterated that we hope to hold more meetings like this in the future, and we hope that these meetings will be beneficial to the interests of both nations. [Text] [LD032036 Tehran Domestic Service in Persian 1630 GMT 3 Jun 81]



# RESUMPTION OF RELATIONS WITH U.S. DISCUSSED

London AL-MAJALLAH in Arabic 25 Apr 81 p 22

[Article: "Diplomatic Relations Between Iraq and United States May Be Resumed Before Convocation of Nonalignment Summit"]

[Text] Washington--Exclusive Dispatch--The question raised by observers in the wake of the visit to Baghdad by Morris Draper, the U.S. assistant secretary of state for Middle East affairs, last week and of Draper's lengthy meeting with Sa'dun Hammadi, the Iraqi minister of foreign affairs, is:

Will the diplomatic relations between Iraq and the United States, severed since 1967, be resumed and when?

The visit of Draper, who accompanied U.S. Secretary of State Alexander Haig on his Middle East tour, to Baghdad was the first visit made by a high-level U.S. official to the Iraqi capital since 1977 when Philip Habib, a prominent official of the U.S. Department of State, was dispatched by the Carter administration to visit Baghdad. Draper's visit to Baghdad has come in the wake of significant developments, the most important of which are the Iraq-Iran war, the strong rapprochement between Iraq and the Gulf states, led by the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, the strong coordination between Baghdad and Amman and, the tepid Iraqi-Soviet relations as a result of Moscow's failure to supply weapons to Baghdad after the eruption of the war with Tehran. This visit has also come in the wake of the emergence of signs that Iraq has become more open to the West than in the past within the framework of its eagerness to preserve the independence of its political position and decision. This eagerness is considered one of the mainstays of President Saddam Husayn's policy. This is why the question concerning restoration of the diplomatic relations between Baghdad and Washington has risen.

Well-informed Arab diplomatic sources have assured AL-MAJALLAH that diplomatic relations between Baghdad and Washington will certainly be resumed, perhaps in the near future. But no one can define now a specific date for this step. There have been reports that the relations will be resumed before convocation of the nonaligned countries summit conference in Baghdad in 1982. But the same well-informed sources say that they cannot confirm this. However, anything is likely. It is well-known that Baghdad attaches major importance to the convocation of the nonaligned summit.

## Step on America's Part

It is the opinion of well-informed observers that it is difficult for diplomatic relations between the two countries to be restored before the United States takes an important political step vis-a-vis Iraq. Iraq has two fundamental issues, namely: The Arab-Israeli conflict, with its crux being the Palestinian issue with all its aspects, and the war with Iran.

These observers believe that Reagan's administration must take some steps at the level of solving the Palestinian problem or at the level of the Iraq-Iran war before these relations are resumed. In any case, the Iraqi sources say that resumption of the diplomatic relations with Washington, in case it happens, will not at all change Baghdad's fundamental positions toward the Middle East crisis or toward any important international issue.

## It Will not Be at Moscow's Expense

The question raised by observers in this regard is: Will the resumption of relations between Baghdad and Washington come at the expense of the relations between Baghdad and Moscow and will the Iraqi-Soviet relations be affected in case an Iraqi-U.S. rapprochement happens?

Answering this question, the well-informed sources say that any Iraqi-U.S. rapprochement will under no circumstances be at the expense of Baghdad's relations with the Soviet Union, unlike what happened, for example, with President al-Sadat. The well-informed sources acknowledge that there is some tepidity in the Iraqi-Soviet relations because of Moscow's refrainment from sending weapons to Baghdad and of its failure to implement contracts signed long ago under the pretext that the Soviets want to be "neutral" in the Iraq-Iran war. However, this tepidity will not affect the entire relations between Moscow and Baghdad and will not push the Iraqis toward adopting dramatic steps against the Russians as Egypt or Somalia, for example, did. Even though there is a friendship and cooperation treaty between Baghdad and Moscow, this treaty has not stopped the Iraqis from criticizing several aspects of the Soviet policy, most significant of which is the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan.

So, what is the reality of the Iraqi-U.S. relations and what is the significance and outcome of Draper's visit to Baghdad?

The U.S. envoy was careful to familiarize the Iraqi officials with the broad lines of the Reagan administration's foreign policy and with the aspects of this policy concerning the Middle East. The envoy was also careful to familiarize the officials with the outcome of Haig's tour in the area. It has become evident that Baghdad opposes strongly the Camp David treaty and demands a just and comprehensive solution to the Palestinian problem--a solution acceptable to the Palestinians. It has also become evident that Baghdad opposes the policy of alliances and blocs as a way to confront the Soviets and their escalating influence in the area and that it also opposes the current U.S. concept that gives priority to confronting the Soviets. The Iraq-Iran war and its future possibilities were brought up in these discussions. Several issues concerning both sides were also discussed. Informed U.S. sources say that the importance of Draper's visit to Baghdad lies in the fact that it will open the door for further dialogue between the two countries and will encourage many U.S. firms to operate in Iraq. This in itself is an interesting development.

8494

CSO: 4802/720

## DIFFERENCES WITHIN COMMUNIST PARTY CITED

London AL-HAWADITH in Arabic 1 May 81 p 27

[Article by Sulayman al-Farzali: "Peaceful Observations in Time of War; Split Between Iraqi Communists and Their Leadership Abroad"]

[Text] The Iraqis acknowledge that the Iraqi communists are the ones who talk most and write most profusely. But the Iraqi communists are silent these days. Their silence is not in observation of the rule that "if words are silver, then silence is golden." In large part, this silence conceals certain objective facts, some pertaining to the country's situation, some pertaining to external conditions and some connected with the [Iraqi] Communist Party leadership which is separated from its bases. Even though there are those who say that the communists' silence itself is tantamount to words, there is no doubt that the matter (merits consideration).

A visitor to Iraq cannot form a complete or integrated idea about the country without familiarizing himself with the political, intellectual and psychological conditions of the communists. It is evident now that the Iraqi communists live in some sort of isolation. Furthermore, some of these communists describe this state as "schizophrenia."

The war has intensified the acuteness of this state because the sentiments of the communists have been divided between national allegiance and adherence to a foreign policy represented by the party leadership abroad. However, the Iraq-Iran war has motivated numerous communists, especially recently, to declare openly that they are not convinced by their leadership's position. This position was not clear at the outset of the war and observers say that this [lack of clarity] was deliberate, with the aim of finding out the inclinations and the course of the war.

The Iraqi Government has not been surprised by the speech delivered by 'Aziz Muhammad, the Iraqi Communist Party secretary, to the 26th congress of the Soviet Communist Party in Moscow--a speech which criticized the war and the Iraqi policy toward Iran. Neither was the government surprised by the fact that the Soviet leadership permitted 'Aziz Muhammad to deliver such a speech from the highest Soviet podium. The Iraqi communists have also not been surprised by the speech but a large sector of them has not been pleased with it.

The communists in Baghdad say that the party leadership abroad is not united, by evidence of the fact that it lives in more than one country at present. Some of

the leaders live presently in Moscow or in East European countries, others in Beirut, others in Tehran and yet others in Aden. The Ba'thists ruling Iraq say that not all this communist dispersal is compulsory and that there are communist leaders who departed with the consent and the assistance of the authority.

In Baghdad, I tried as much as possible to get a clear analysis of the situation of the communists there from some people who are close to them and to whom I am tied by an old friendship. Perhaps the only element on which all have agreed is that the current situation of the Iraqi communists is due in large part to the vacillating position of the party leadership toward the current regime in Iraq. The Iraqi Communist Party leadership had described the July 1968 revolution which brought the Ba'th Party to power as a mere "military coup." In 1973, when the Communist Party entered the Progressive National and Pan-Arab Front with the Ba'th Party, the communist leadership changed its position and the "military coup" became a revolutionary change and even a democratic national revolution. As soon as the Communist Party left the front, the current regime again became, in their view, a dictatorial regime serving the interests of the U.S. imperialism.

Naturally, it is not easy for the Iraqis, especially the communists, to forget the extensive Communist Party literature lavishly praising the government leadership in Iraq, especially the Communist Party Central Committee reports praising the government's national development policy and the solutions the government has provided for the difficult national problems, particularly the Kurdish problem. The reports even contain frank positions concerning the Iranian danger and the persistent Iranian aggression against the territories of the Republic of Iraq. At the time, the Communist Party organ, called AL-THAQAFAH AL-JADIDAH (New Culture), published an editorial on the occasion of the 28th anniversary of the Ba'th Party, i.e. on 7 April 1975, describing this party as the "party of sacrifices and victories."

This is in addition to personal letters from 'Aziz Muhammad himself to the Iraqi political leadership, letters from Zaki Khayri, member of the Political Bureau, and to numerous articles in the communist TARIQ AL-SHA'B paper underlining numerous issues to which the Communist Party leadership abroad has now turned its back.

It is premature to say or to conclude that the Iraqi Communist Party has become two parties: One at home and one abroad. However, it is certain that there is a dual mood in the Iraqi Communist Party. This is because the economic and social transformations realized in recent years have created a big change in the social relations--a change bringing about the unprecedented prosperity now prevailing at all levels. Moreover, the general distribution of wealth has included numerous sectors of the people that had not been previously included to the degree that the Iraqi workers and farmers have now become somewhat distinguished classes and to the point, according to some Iraqis, that "you can no longer talk" to a worker. A visitor to Iraq notices immediately that the workers are (fanikhun), according to the Iraqi expression, meaning that the improvement in their material and living conditions has been accompanied by a kind of pride and boastfulness that reaches the point of provocative insolence. If, for example, you clap your hands to draw a restaurant worker's attention, he considers such behavior an insult and he may insult or even beat you, as happened with us at al-Shumu' Restaurant where we were having lunch with Salah 'Umar al-'Ali, the head of the Iraqi delegation to the UN.



Therefore, the country's economic and social situation does not constitute a rallying call which a party, such as the Communist Party, can exploit.

An important observation with which an observer visiting a country like Iraq, where the communist used to carry weight, emerges is that communism as an ideology is no longer tempting or that it is no longer adequate to meet the intellectual and psychological need of those attached to it. It has lost its attraction, (as evidenced by external manifestations, not to mention the internal criterion of the developmental movement of the Iraqi society).

What is happening in Poland at present, for example, leaves the impression among the Iraqis that communism as an ideology has grown old and that it is no longer capable of comprehending the national, pan-Arab and human aspirations. In this regard, communism is the subject of suspicion and questions. What has happened in Cuba has also been the subject of discussion. Some Iraqis who visited Havana recently have told us that Castro had thought that opening the door of emigration would provide an opportunity to get rid of several hundred old people whose hearts or minds the revolution has not been able to enter. But Castro was surprised to find that hundreds of thousands of youth who grew up under the revolution and all of whom are of working age (20-45 years) also wanted to leave and it seemed to him that all the people wanted to emigrate.

There remains the issue of the relationship with the Soviet Union. This relationship has also become the subject of suspicion and questions in the wake of the occupation of Afghanistan. The sole standard argument with which some communists arm themselves is the argument that whoever fails to befriend the Soviets is necessarily tied to the Americans. But this argument is not met with much credibility. Iraq's relationship with the Soviet Union is not weak. As a relationship between one state and another, it is rather strong. When Kosygin, the departed Soviet prime minister, was in Baghdad in April 1972 to sign the friendship treaty, he proposed the creation of a front comprising the communists and the Ba'athists in Iraq. Saddam Husayn told him that this was a matter which concerned only the Iraqis themselves. Saddam also said: We want to deal with the communists not because they are loyal to you but because they are an Iraqi party. Our position toward them and their position toward us must be established on purely Iraqi considerations. We don't like or want the communists to lose their national identity by putting the interests of others above the interests of their country.

We ask the Iraqi officials: Are there communists whose positions have stiffened and who reiterate unrealistic slogans. The officials say: Parrotism is a condition that exists everywhere and at all times. However, there is a big difference between what the tongue utters and what the mind accepts. These people are like he who transports water in a basket or he who conceals the sun with a sieve.

8494

CSO: 4802/720



## IRAQ

### 'LE MONDE' READERS DISCUSS NUCLEAR CAPABILITY

Paris LE MONDE in French 15 May 81 p 7

[Correspondence]

[Text] A Letter from Mr Hajdenberg

Mr Hajdenberg, president of Jewish Renewal, writes us:

Prof Alfred Kastler, reiterating some of his remarks to Jewish Renewal, presented his thoughts in LE MONDE on 16 April, in response to the advertisement published by our movement in your paper on 1 and 2 February about the danger inherent in France's providing Iraq with nuclear technology.

As we sincerely respect the opinions of Professor Kastler and his interest in the problem of nonproliferation, we would truly like to be certain that it is not "improbable" but "impossible" for Iraq to obtain nuclear weapons through France.

In his scientific argument, Professor Kastler does not mention the fact that Italy has provided Iraq with a laboratory enabling it to transform the 93 percent enriched uranium obtained from France to 96 percent enriched uranium.

Iraq could therefore use this operational uranium for military purposes; that is, it could build one or more bombs of the Hiroshima type.

Professor Kastler also does not mention the fact that Iraq has refused to accept low-enriched uranium of the "caramel" type from France; this is a type of fuel which can be used only for civilian purposes. The distinguished scientist, in his argument, relies primarily on the texts of the international treaties which Iraq has signed, and on the means of control ensuring the proper use of this fuel for peaceful purposes, so that he can believe that this "danger," which he does mention, is "improbable."

In this respect, it was imperative and vital for him to mention what some people do not realize: according to the very terms of the nonproliferation treaty which Iraq has signed, Iraq can withdraw from this agreement, terminating its commitments after a simple 3-month notice to that effect.

On this point I will mention the warning uttered by Prof Francis Perrin, the "father of the French atom bomb," in speaking to a French daily paper. "I feel that it is not reasonable for this treaty to be shrouded in secrecy, for such secrecy can only arouse international suspicion, which is unhealthy. Iraq could say from one day to the next: "I will refuse the controls of the International Atomic Energy Agency; now I am going to use enriched uranium however I want."

On the subject of the controls themselves, what are they really worth when it is the "controlee" who holds the upper hand, and who can put off any inspection for a period of 45 days immediately after receiving a shipment of 12 kilos of uranium?

Doesn't Professor Kastler himself say that only Iraq's moral commitment combined with these controls could keep it from moving to military technology? And how could we believe that, knowing as we do Iraq's policy of aggression?

We could hardly be confident when the French government sent Mirage aircraft to Iraq, at war against Iran, under a cloak of secrecy.

We can not feel reassured about this when no national debate has begun on this issue, when no parliamentary commission has considered the issue, at the very time when France's actions are creating an explosive situation in the Middle East.

How could we not fear the worst when a former prime minister (editor's note: Mr Chirac, whose main comments follow) who was responsible for this initiative on the part of France, has let it be known that if he had stayed in office the risks would have been lesser, as he would have added in the Franco-Iraqi contract some more restrictive and binding clauses?

#### Mr Chirac's Comments

On 5 March of this year Mr Chirac told the Jewish Telegraph Agency:

The arrangements made for this agreement and for supplying the fuel for the Osirak reactor, as well as the reactor itself--the fuel was of course enriched uranium--were examined in Paris with extreme caution and with the intention of not taking any risks. That was the situation until I left the government.

I don't know any of the details about what happened after I left. I can only say that the final arrangements for the delivery were made after I left; it was in October 1976 that the prime minister, Raymond Barre, was to give his agreement to the appropriate minister for this operation and for this shipment.

I can't tell you any more about it. I do remember, though, that Iraq did make a certain number of promises. Iraq did sign the nonproliferation treaty for nuclear weapons, pledging not to obtain nuclear weapons, and in 1972 it signed an agreement with the AIEA [International Atomic Energy Agency] in Vienna, placing its nuclear activities under the control of that agency. In practice, those controls combine an accounting procedure for nuclear materials, the installation of automatic cameras and seals, and visits by inspectors. With all of these means, any misuse or even any suspicious handling of nuclear materials can be detected in time. These controls are now used in 47 countries and to date no materials subject to the control of the AIEA have been used for an explosion.

I will add also that under my administration the Franco-Iraqi agreement of 18 November 1975 confirmed these guarantees by specific commitments. To my knowledge, the first shipments of uranium made to Iraq were in May 1980 under the control of the Vienna agency. That agency also sent an inspection mission there after the bombing of the reactor site, as specified by the Iraq-AIEA agreement.

That is what I wanted to say on this subject. I am well aware of the danger entailed in any misuse of nuclear materials for non-peaceful purposes. I insisted that the maximum number of guarantees be made, and I can speak for the period when I was in the government. I am certainly unable to give any details about conditions when the final decisions were made after I left. These decisions were made by the prime minister, acting under the authority of the president.

I also want to say that at no time did the French government which I headed agree, either for itself or on behalf of any public or private company participating in the projects, to any request that would have excluded French nationals of the Jewish faith from working on the Osirak project.

#### Professor Kastler's Response

It is not my intention to begin a debate with Mr Hajdenberg. I simply wanted to point out, speaking in the name of the French Pugewash group, an incorrect statement, which its authors knew was incorrect: "The French government is sending to Iraq 12 kilograms of highly enriched uranium, enabling Iraq to manufacture three to four atom bombs of the Hiroshima type."

In his answer, Mr Hajdenberg very skillfully confuses two dangers: the danger resulting from the preceding statement, which is imaginary; and another danger, quite real, but more distant. The operation of the Osirak reactor--like the operation of any other nuclear reactor--produces plutonium, the raw material for nuclear bombs. It takes time to accumulate the amount of plutonium needed to make a bomb, and one must master a sophisticated technology in order to handle this transformation.

The case of India has shown that a Third World nation is capable of acquiring this technology. However, the scientific level in Iraq is far from being, right now, the same as it is in India. But it is probable that by the end of the century Iraq and about 10 other countries will have joined the "nuclear club."

This change will be deadly if the major nuclear powers continue to overarm themselves instead of turning to disarmament as they had promised to do when signing the nonproliferation treaty for nuclear weapons.

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CSO: 4800/68



## INTERVIEW WITH PRESIDENT NAVON ON EGYPTIAN-ISRAELI RELATIONS

TA071036 Tel Aviv 'AL HAMISHMAR in Hebrew 7 Jun 81 np 3, 4

[Interview with President of the State of Israel Yitzhaq Navon by Refa'el Barqan, Mark Gefen, Yisra'el Zamir, Shim'on Shofti and Yitzhaq Shor at the presidential residence: "I Will Consider Political Activity After I Retire From My Post"; date not given]

[Excerpt] Question: Mr President, a few months ago you visited Egypt. I am not going to rate your visit but, having been a member of your entourage, I think it aroused great excitement among the Egyptians. I also recall another opportunity, after dinner on the last day of the visit, when you convened your entourage and give it a brief summary. Among other things you said that, apart from the general political agreements you spelled out and the relations you established with the Egyptian president, tangible agreements had been reached on the exchange of youth delegations and other things. Our question is: Do you communicate with President Al-Sadat? What things have been fulfilled out of the tangible agreements?

Answer: I will start with the second part of your question. In the meeting with Al-Sadat I think 10 things were agreed upon and 8 of them have been fulfilled. Two have not materialized yet but I cannot blame the Egyptians for it.

It was agreed that the land border between Israel and Egypt would open--and it has been open and operating since 15 December. It was agreed on a fourth El Al flight [a week], and there is one, regarding a parliamentary delegation, it was agreed upon at the time and it has materialized. As for the visits of ministers--our and their agriculture ministers--I concluded this and sent a cable to this effect to the government at the time and it was carried out.

It was agreed to ratify the trade agreement, and it has been ratified. The cultural agreement has not yet been approved, but the Egyptians also agreed to ratify that. However, as stated, the trade agreement was ratified and it will be possible to act according to it. Also discussed was the matter of access to Santa Catherina from Israel without having to go there via Egypt, and this has materialized. The price has risen, but it is possible to reach the site from Israel.

The issue of youth meetings was discussed and there will be an exchange of youth delegations in August. A delegation left for Egypt to meet on, to agree to, to sign and to conclude this matter. Initially, there will only be a group of 70 people [as published], three groups of 20 boys and girls will arrive here and a similar group of Israeli youths will go to Egypt. I told Al-Sadat [in private] and I also declared it in public that contact must start at an early age; they must meet in order for peace to be a natural and normal thing. The members of the previous generation carry a load of prejudices and this is not at all simple. You [presumably journalists] must also work on it, but youngsters must meet. I think that youth meetings must also take place within Israel. However, this is another story altogether.

Two things have not yet been fulfilled. The first is the issue of the exhibition. I discussed our participation in fairs and this has materialized--I do not know whether as a result of my visit or not. I spoke about an Israeli exhibition in Egypt which would include everything: the history of the people, its culture and achievements, trade, industry and culture. I told Al-Sadat: I am not talking only about an industrial exhibition or a commercial exhibition, about sales and purchases; this is not my intention. An exhibition is needed to show who is the Jewish people and what is the State of Israel. Al-Sadat replied: Please. They will send their Egyptian exhibition to Israel. I suggested that it should not only be an exhibition about ancient Egypt but, if possible, also in Islam. In principle, his response was positive, however, one should work on it. All these things are known to those concerned but it is not up to me to carry them out.

Another point was raised which I defined as the establishment of a headquarters. I said: In times of war there is a command for war issues, now a headquarters for the peace issues is needed. This actually means the establishment of a committee of education officials, psychologists, sociologists, government officials and intellectuals who will sit together and discuss how to bring the sides closer, how to establish peace between two nations that are not only divided by wars and blood but also by different religions. It is not only the difference in religions, there is also the complexity of Judaism and Islam--and the Egyptians are a Muslim people. One should also examine how to educate our two nations on the issue of peace. Each committee would convene in its country and once every 3 to 6 months the two committees would meet to exchange views and discuss future plans: what is the curriculum in schools? What is the education program? What is happening in the radio, press and television? How does one overcome prejudices and the objective difficulties?

This project has not yet materialized. I think that if we established such a headquarters in Israel and if we encouraged the Egyptians to do the same--there is no reason why it should not start functioning.

Question: That is to say, all the points agreed upon have in fact materialized.

Answer: You asked me on the relations. Well, from time to time I receive greetings from Al-Sadat. Whenever they meet with Al-Sadat Israeli officials

call me up. Agriculture Minister Sharon also called me to convey Al-Sadat's greetings to me. I delivered a message to him through our ambassador, I suppose I will get an answer from him. He also sent me an official and formal letter on the occasion of independence day.

He also sent me a very warm message--which I have yet to answer--marking the first anniversary of the establishment of mutual relations. I invited the staff of the Egyptian Embassy to my residence to make a toast and so on. In the wake of this invitation, the Egyptian president wrote me a very warm letter.

Yet, normally I do not deal with routine matters which require unnecessary communications.

Question: Your honorable president, regarding the issue of relations with Egypt, do you foresee the possibility or the chance of expanding the framework of peace to include our neighboring countries or will it be confined only to Egypt? Will we pursue the first way?

Answer: I regard the main target as strengthening the peace with Egypt, turning it into a reality, both in the Israeli and Egyptian consciousness. Before my trip, I encountered heavy suspicions on both our and their sides. In Israel--and I explained this to Al-Sadat when we discussed normalization--peace is seen mainly in terms of the withdrawal from the territories, the handover of oil and airfields, the uprooting of settlements, the construction of new airfields and the transfer of IDF bases from the Sinai. People apparently have different expectations from peace but they only see these things as the so-called reality. They do not see expressions of peace, other than the establishment of embassies, relations, messages and visits.

First and foremost, peace to me means that our sons live their lives without being killed in their prime. If this were the only reason for peace, it would justify itself and its existence. The very fact that we will not have to fight and our children do not have to go to war--this is peace. If there is only this and there is no money--it is enough on its own merit. Of course, other things must be done in addition. However, the fundamental thing is life.

Yet, there must be more tangible expressions of peace. I tried to explain this to Al-Sadat when I spoke about normalization. What is normalization? Is it that we are going to sell them more eggs or more tomatoes? We are not interested in the financial aspect. We want the Israeli public to see the expressions of peace, not only an ambassador or the establishment of diplomatic relations which are very abstract things. Thus, we want more Egyptians to visit here, we want more extended relations and ties.

I have seen their suspicions when things such as the "Jerusalem Law" or the crisis in the autonomy talks occurred. They attribute all these difficulties to Israel, as if Israel did not mean to implement the peace treaty, as if Israel wanted a separate agreement. [The Egyptians think] that Israel neither

wants to solve the Palestinian problem nor make peace with the other Arab countries, and that Israel feels comfortable. That is what they said to me: apparently you are pleased with merely a separate peace with Egypt; but this is impossible. We cannot have a separate peace with you, the Camp David accords talk about a comprehensive peace.

Now we have to tackle the question of autonomy. I regard a successful completion of the negotiations on the autonomy almost as the condition for the subsistence of peace with Egypt. There is a cold war and there is also a cold peace, there could be a cold peace. It might arouse feelings of frustration among many people in Israel. These people will say: What is this peace about? We have sacrificed such a great deal and what did we get in return: nothing.

We are now undergoing some kind of transition period. There is some kind of optical delusion that nothing is happening. This may go on but things are going to pick up one day after the elections. The Egyptians will demand to continue the autonomy negotiations. Led by Reagan, the Americans--who are also committed to the Camp David accords--will demand the continuation of the talks. I assume that there will also be willingness on our part to continue the negotiations, there is not much time left.

What does it mean, there is not much time left? There is apparently no time limit. However, since the date is set for the final evacuation of the Sinai in April 1982 I would be very glad if we reached an agreement with Egypt on the issue of autonomy before the final evacuation from the Sinai. I would not like the evacuation of the Sinai to end amid difficult and boisterous disputes between us and the Egyptians, because this may deepen the suspicions of the Israelis. My impression is that Egypt intends to fully implement the step it has taken on the issue of peace; they mean peace.

Question: Similar to the British crown, the president of the State of Israel symbolizes the unity of all the citizens. It seems to me that there has recently been a weakening in the relations between the Israeli Arabs and the state. Do you regard the situation likewise? If so, what are the initial steps that we should take to strengthen this relation and to deepen [line missing in original]

Answer: First of all, there must be a dialogue but, to my regret, there is no dialogue. I am not talking about isolated cases of individuals here and there. Generally speaking, we live as two separate groups. There is no dialogue with the Israeli Arabs.

Reviewing the attitude of the Israeli Arabs, I do not think that, except for several isolated cases, we can raise claims about their actual deeds. In actual fact, they have not displayed a negative attitude against the state, both from the security and other points of view. However, a worrisome change has occurred and there are subterranean changes and currents which occasionally surface.

I do not think this is a cross we are doomed to carry. We may not be able to give it up altogether but we may make it smaller. However, this takes two sides and, I am sorry to say, I have not witnessed a dialogue with this part



of the population for years. A dialogue should be held by the government, the heads of all the parties and public leaders and from them, downward.

Answer [Navon]: For instance, I attended several meetings at Bet Berl, very important Jewish-Arab meetings and meetings of schools. I heard from both Jews and Arabs what had happened in a simple meeting when Jews stayed overnight in an Arab village and Arabs spent the night at Jewish homes. Large changes occur as a result of such meetings. First of all, one discovers that we are all human beings and this is a big surprise. I spoke about this theme with the Egyptians, with newspapers editors and writers, about the humanization of literature. Not just another Arab Muhammad or another Jewish Cohen and their stereotypes. They are all people who have wives, a mother-in-law, children, toothaches; they break plates, they feel envy, they have neighbors--suddenly we have become neighbors--in one word, humanization. Shulamit Har-Even once wrote a very nice article on this issue.

In a special broadcast on the occasion of independence day I said to the Arabs: I know that there are Jews who would like to see not even one Arab in Israel and there are Arabs who would like to see not even one Jew in the country. However, this will help neither of them. We have been doomed to have people with the former and the latter opinions. Since this has been imposed on us, let us see how we can live together with understanding, friendship and in peace. This is possible because there are very positive elements who are willing to do so. This must be a coordinated operation.

I am not pleased with the fact that there is no dialogue. I am not pleased with the direction our relations have taken.

Finally, let me just add one more word without specifying or elaborating on the issue: it is not so easy to detach this topic from the general issue of Israel's relations with the other Arab countries and the Palestinian question. The late 'Abd al-'Aziz Zu'abi, a former Knesset member on behalf of Mapam, once said: I am an Israeli Arab and there is a state of war between my people and my country--and I am in the middle of this conflict. The spiritual conflict of being an Arab, a member of the Arab nation which is in a state of war with the country you are a citizen of, stems from the state of Israel's relations with its neighbors and the Palestinian Arabs. If this problem is solved, it will necessarily make an impact on the relations within Israel as well.

CSO: 4323/7

## POLL ON ELECTION ISSUES

TA071352 Tel Aviv MA'ARIV in Hebrew 7 Jun 81 p 14

[Hanokh Smith elections forecast: "Almost 70 Percent Support Settlements"]

[Text] While Menahem Begin rules the political arena, clearly aided by Yoram Aridor's economic policy, other Likud figures have also contributed their share.

It is hard to estimate David Levi's contribution. The Likud's relatively good appearance in the Histadrut elections on 7 April is attributed to him, but in practical terms, it was the Alignment which really won those elections and the Likud drew satisfaction only from the dissipation of earlier fears of total defeat.

A clear-cut contribution to the Likud's recent success was made by Ari'el Sharon in his policy regarding Judaea and Samaria. Only a year ago Minister Sharon was a relatively unpopular minister. However, upon the emerging success of his settlement policy ("we are on the map") his prestige has risen. The clearest evidence of this is the change occurring in the public's attitude toward the preferred settlement policy for Judaea and Samaria. This can be learned from the following table:

	<u>March 1980</u>	<u>Sep 1980</u>	<u>Nov 80</u>	<u>May 81</u>
Sharon's or Gush Enumin's position on broad settlement in Judaea and Samaria	14	22	28	29
'Ezer Weizman's position--controlled settlement in defined blocks	20	19	15	19
Position of part of the opposition-- settlement only in strategic regions not populated with Arabs	21	20	23	20
Against new settlements but for strengthening existing settlements	9	11	9	6
Against setting up settlements in times of peace negotiations	21	14	12	7
Other	4	1	1	1
No opinion	11	13	12	18

The change has been dramatic indeed. In the March 1980 poll only 14 percent of the public supported the Sharon-Gush Enamin position. This rate had doubled by November 1980 and remained stable since: 29 percent support this position in the last poll.

The policy associated with 'Ezer Weizman's name (although he has been outside the government for a long time now) is still preferred among 19 percent of the public in the May poll. Also the basic position of part of the opposition remains stable: 20 percent of the public prefer it in the last poll.

Constant erosion has occurred in the more "dovish" stands. The stands that uphold the complete cessation of settlements or only expanding existing ones dropped from an overall rate of 30 percent in March [1980] to a little more than 13 percent a year later.

In other words, the more national positions regarding Judaea and Samaria settlements has constantly gained the public's support while the opponents of these positions have constantly lost support.

Regarding other moves in regional policy, previous Smith Institute's polls had already reflected the stiffening occurring among the public against territorial concessions, not even in return for peace with Jordan or other countries. However, as a major elections issue the problem of the territorial solution had a very low priority. The public was presented with a list of 14 issues and asked which are the two most important problems the new government would have to deal with. The answers regarding the four major problems are in the following table (in percentage).

The Four Important Tasks  
(in percentages)

	(1) Most important	(2) Second important	(1) & (2)
Economy (including inflation)	47	30	77
Security	25	31	56
Social gap	5	14	19
The continuation of the peace process	5	5	10

The central role of the economic problems was expected. However, it seems that the Lebanese-Syrian crisis gave a serious impetus to an increase in the importance of security problems. Therefore the two issues of economy and security seem the decisive issues that the new government will have to handle.

Two other issues, the social gap and the continued peace process, also received certain preference, although to a much lesser degree than the two main issues. All the other issues (immigration and emigration, foreign and information policy, the quality of life, political leadership, concern for housing for

the needy, the drug problem, a change in the elections system and settlements in Judaea and Samaria received few votes as the two major problems the new government will have to handle.

In summing up the findings of the May poll we found that the Likud's recovery since January began upon Aridor's economic policy while Prime Minister Begin made use of this recovery in the spheres of security and foreign policy. David Levi, Ari'el Sharon and others added their contributions, each in their own particular fields.

This show of force does not cover up weaknesses. Despite the rising support for the Likud, the public still assesses its functioning in the spheres of economy, society and foreign policy as less than good. In the security field, due to the complex Syrian crisis the government's status has even declined in the last poll.

These weaknesses, not clearly visible, are taken advantage of by the opposition and can still embarrass the Likud. Therefore it is difficult to assess whether the Likud's momentum will continue, stabilize or recede in the decisive days ahead. Therefore, everybody's eyes will be turned to the polling booths as election day draws near.

CSO: 4323/7



## SMITH POLL SHOWS LIKUD LEADING

TA051541 Tel Aviv MA'ARIV in Hebrew 5 Jun 81 p 16

[Hanokh Smith elections forecast: "Begin's Activity (Attacking Schmidt) and Aridor's (the Reductions) Have Had an Impact on the Polls"]

[Text] Since January 1981 when the government's popularity was in an all time low and a decision was made to advance the elections following the "Hurvitz Crisis," the Likud has achieved an impressive increase in its public support. This support has increased gradually and at the end of May the Likud enjoyed a 1-percent edge over the Alignment according to the public opinion poll conducted by the Smith Institute, as can be seen in the following table:

<u>Date</u>	<u>Support for the Major Parties</u> (in percent)					<u>All Coalition Parties</u>
	<u>Likud</u>	<u>Alignment</u>	<u>Religious</u>	<u>Others</u>	<u>Not Decided</u>	
January 1981	14	44	10	6	26	25
March 1981	20	41.5	9	10.5	10	20
May 1981	34	33	8	10	15	42

The Likud's recovery may be viewed in two stages. The first big rise, in March, can be attributed to Finance Minister Yoram Aridor's economic policy. In March's poll 51 percent of all polled said this policy increases the Likud's chance to win the elections. In that same poll the prime minister's popularity dropped from 39 percent who believed he was successful in his job in January to 36 percent in March, the Likud's rise in that period was by a nice 6 percent, mostly from the ranks of those who said in January they had not yet decided who to vote for. The initial achievements of the Likud were then made among the voters who gave their vote to the Likud in the 1977 elections and had since moved into the ranks of the "undecided."

The larger increase was noted between March and May—a full 14 percent! This time the Likud's achievement was at the expense of the Alignment and was scored mainly among people who voted for the Likud in 1977 and then turned to support the Alignment for some time. Some of the support for the Likud also came at the expense of the religious parties, especially the NRP.

In May's public poll, Prime Minister Begin has started to obtain the central place in the public support as emerging from the following table. The question in the poll was: "In your opinion does the government succeed or not in the following spheres?" (the percentage given is of the people who said it was either "successful" or "mostly successful")

**The Government Succeeds (or Mostly Succeeds) in Its Actions  
(in percentage)**

	<u>Sep 1979</u>	<u>Sep 1980</u>	<u>Jan 1981</u>	<u>March 1981</u>	<u>May 1981</u>
In the Economic Sphere	11	14	9	15	23
In the Social Sphere	18	18	16	21	30
In Security Affairs	69	56	56	67	56
In Foreign Affairs	44	20	30	37	41
Your General Opinion of the Government	25	17	14	20	34

Here one can see that the government's popularity in January sank very low. Then only 9 percent of all polled believed that the government was successful or mostly successful in handling the economy and only 14 percent (one out of seven Jewish voters in Israel) believed that in general the government was successful or mostly successful in its operations.

In March 6 more percent of all polled believed that the government was successful in the economic field. The number of those who believed then that the government was successful in its operations rose by the same percent and so did the number of those who expressed their wish to vote for the Likud.

However, in the period between the two polls of March and May there was an increase of 14 percent in the number of voters who believed that the government was always or was usually successful, and the increase in the number of voters supporting the Likud was likewise. These increases were bigger than the increases in the various categories of the government's functioning. The increases in the economic sphere was by 8 percent, and in the foreign affairs area by 4 percent. A decrease was marked in the support of the government with regard to security matters, apparently due to the situation in Lebanon. This indicates that the increase in the support for the Likud stems from other, external reasons.

The central external element is surely the prime minister's latest activity. For instance, his attacks on West German Chancellor Helmut Schmidt had repercussions among the Jewish voting population in Israel: while 20 percent of those polled believed that the attacks were irresponsible and harmed Israel's foreign relations, 35 percent fully identified with Begin's declarations. Another 21 percent agreed with the prime minister's basic stance but believed

he should not have declared it publicly. In that poll 9 percent chose the answer whereby "he should not have made these declarations publicly but this caused no damage to Israel's cause." Only 9 percent said they were not familiar with Begin's statements on Schmidt, while 6 percent decided not to express an opinion at all. The percentage of those who fully agree with the prime minister was particularly high among Likud voters.

Finance Minister Aridor's contribution to the Likud's rise in the May poll was also considerable. Again, fully 30 percent of the voters believed that Aridor's policy contributed to the Likud's chances to win the elections--almost as many as those who believed so in the March poll.

On the other hand, the public is aware that the finance minister's economic policy is an "elections economics." Of all polled 40 percent believed that Aridor's actions were intended to aid the Likud in the elections. However, 21 percent believed this was a really new economic policy aimed at curbing the inflation; another 18 percent believed that this was both a new economic policy and a means to improve the Likud's popularity. The remaining 15 percent said they had no opinion. Incidentally, there were similar results in the March poll.

Be it this or that, no erosion has occurred in Aridor's policy influence on the electorate between the end of March and the end of May.

While the Likud enjoys success in the present poll, there still does not seem to be a clear chance for the reestablishment of a Likud-led coalition with the participation of the religious parties (without the disintegrated democratic movement for change) [which split into Shinuy and the democratic movement]. All the coalition parties received only 42 percent of the Jewish vote in May and only 39 percent of all votes, if one takes into account the voters from the minorities as well.

In contrast, also the Alignment which received 33 percent of the Jewish votes cannot now be sure of its ability to form a coalition. Together with small parties such as the citizens rights movement of Shulamit Aloni, Amnon Rubinstein's Shinuy, the independent liberals and Sheli. This bloc of parties achieved 39 percent of the Jewish votes and 36 percent of all votes including those of the minorities--a little less than a possible Likud-led coalition.

Among the 25 percent who do not support the Likud, the Alignment or the religious parties 15 percent have no opinion yet and they will be the ones to decide the campaign finally. Five percent (or more) will vote for Rakah, 3 percent for Dayan's Telem (it is yet unclear which bloc this list will join or whether it will be invited to join the coalition) and 2 percent of votes that will apparently be obtained by the lists which will not manage to pass the minimum quota. Now, with only a month left before the elections, it is not yet clear who will form the next government and which parties will participate in the next coalition.

Another element that will affect the final results is the emergence of the Abu-Hatzera Party. It was impossible to measure the strength of this party in the May poll.

However, the general population has not yet reached any consolidated decisions. Only 64 percent of all polled in May said their decision on who to vote for is final. In addition to the 15 percent who said "they have not made up their minds yet," 20 percent stated they have their party already but that it was still possible their preference will change before 30 June. Thus, at the beginning of the last month of the elections campaign the race seems open still. Like the presidential elections in the United States last year it is possible that the decided inclination of the voters will become clear in the last days only, just before the actual vote on 30 June.

CSO: 4323/7



POLL SHOWS PUBLIC MOST CONCERNED OVER INFLATION

TA041000 Tel Aviv HA'ARETZ in Hebrew 4 Jun 81 p 3

[Pori Institute public opinion poll]

[Text] The problem that is now most troubling to the Israeli public is that of inflation and the undermining of the economy, and no party is capable of solving the problem. This is the conclusion of a countryside public opinion poll conducted by the Pori Institute for HA'ARETZ.

Question: "What in your view is the most important problem now facing the country?" To this, 44.3 percent said that the economic situation and the inflation rate constituted the most important problem. In second place was the security issue, including the Palestinian problem and the PLO terrorists; in third place was the implementation of the peace, the introduction of the autonomy plan, and the return of the territories; in fourth place were social problems and the ethnic gap, and in fifth place were strikes, sanctions and the work ethic. Other problems mentioned were housing for young couples, emigration, crime and drug use, education, and the nation's morale.

Asked "Which party is best able to cope with these problems," 41.3 percent were unable to indicate any party capable of dealing with the problems, although 29.9 percent said that the alignment is capable of dealing with the problems, as compared with 21.2 percent who said the Likud is suitable for dealing "in the best way" with these problems.

The poll covered a representative sample of 1,200 men and women throughout the country who were interviewed personally.

CSO: 4323/5

## ISRAEL

### STANCES IN MISSILE CRISIS DISCUSSED

TA021245 Tel Aviv MA'ARIV in Hebrew 2 Jun 81 p 5

[Commentary by Yosef Harif: "The Dialogue Between Israel and Syria"]

[Text] Israel can destroy the Syrian missiles based in Lebanon within 2 hours... There must be a limit to our patience, Prime Minister Menahem Begin warned yesterday; and if we reach the conclusion that the time has come to do it, we shall do it....

The prime minister was simultaneously issuing a warning and not issuing a warning: "There is a limit to our patience," he stressed. But as he went on to refer to the mission of U.S. mediator Philip Habib--even though he saw fit to underscore the total barrenness of this mission from the standpoint of "concrete results," as he put it--he noted that Israel was placing no time limits on it; meaning, on the face of it, that there is no limit to our patience!

These statements by the prime minister were no doubt made against the backdrop of the Syrians' renewed offensive against the civilian Christian population in Lebanon--which explains their timing--but they cannot throw light on what is liable to happen in the coming days or weeks.

What, then, is the forecast: Do the latest events indicate that the danger of war between Israel and Syria has increased? One can perhaps risk a prediction and assert that the answer is a negative one. There will not, apparently, be a war, and this for one simple reason: Neither the Syrians, nor certainly the Israelis, want a war. And the fact that the Syrians have renewed their fierce shelling of Zahlah does not conflict with this assumption. The reason for this may be only to get the U.S. emissary, who is due back in the region at the end of the week, to soften the conditions he put to Syria, and which were basically congruent with the Israeli conditions: the status quo ante.

The prime minister read this map, as it were, and that is why he reacted as he did: Which is to say that his warnings were not directed so much at the Syrians as they were at nudging the Americans and reminding them--before Mr Habib returns to the region--exactly what is involved, so that Habib will be under no illusions and will not try to soften his stands, which are also Israel's stands.

If Begin were intending to adopt a "different course"--that is, one not based on diplomatic means--there would not have been any need to tell the Syrians how long it would take Israel to destroy the missiles, but only to assert afterward how long the air force--or any other IDF branch--had in fact taken to do the job. The reiterated assertion that Israel will not go into action unless it is attacked first also shows that in the prime minister's view, the conditions for any other course are not yet ripe.

Moreover, according to observers Damascus believes that this time Begin means what he says: He really does not intend to act. Why? The Syrians believe that in the few weeks remaining until the elections in Israel, Begin will not want to risk a war. They know that if they go too far the prime minister will have no choice. Therefore, they are gambling up to a certain point. After all, they have to take into consideration that if Begin remains in power, he is liable to pay the Syrians back, whether in July or at any other time he sees fit. The Syrians also know that behind the "moral commitment" to the Christians, which Begin has frequently reiterated, is another Israeli commitment: not to allow the Syrians to choke off the Christians in Lebanon, or to break the Christians leadership to the point where it would surrender and be ready to accept a final solution.

Damascus knows that what it does not achieve now--before 30 June--it will find it difficult to attain after that date, whether Begin or someone else is in power in Israel. Surely no government will allow the Syrians to take over all of Lebanon in both the south and the north, thus placing Israel's north under constant threat. This, then, is the meaning of the Israeli-Syrian "dialogue" now underway: "There is a limit to our patience," is Begin's reaction to the Syrians' attack on Zahlah, but then he immediately adopts a softer tone and so as not to place his credibility in doubt he takes cover behind Philip Habib and gives him, on the face of it, unlimited time to continue his mission.

Al-Asad is also acting cautiously, despite Israel's repeated attacks against the terrorists--including the Libyans--and he is not severing his diplomatic contacts with Habib, meaning with Israel, for he, too, is aware of the practical significance of "the failure of Habib's mission." So that Damascus, too, for its own convenience, seeks to find cover behind Philip Habib.

Everyone knows that Philip Habib, as he returns to the region, will be bringing no magic solutions, but the continuation of his mission is convenient for both leaders, Begin and Al-Asad, because each of them needs more time: Al-Asad needs time in order to arrive at a settlement which will include the gradual withdrawal of the missiles in a manner that will under no circumstances seem to be a surrender to the United States and Israel (which is why he is seeking some sort of solution within the framework of the supervisory committee of the Arab deterrent force--i.e., the Syrians--in Lebanon, with Saudi and Kuwaiti participation). Begin needs time in order to convince the nation about his steps, including the military option, should the time come.

In order to bring about calm (and the war against Zahlah is merely diplomacy by other means), to demarcate a new red line, even for the reinforcement of existing footholds in Lebanon--the Syrians in the north, the Israelis in the south--an address is required through which Syria and Israel can talk, not just shoot. That address is Philip Habib, even if so far he looks more like an empty mailbox. As long as he is moving about in the area, or holding "consultations" in Washington, there will be no war, and all the signs are that he will be moving about for many long weeks yet....

CSO: 4323/5



POLL INDICATES MAJORITY OPPOSES PLO'S INCLUSION IN NEGOTIATIONS

TA021151 Tel Aviv HA'ARETZ in Hebrew 2 Jun 81 p 5

[Porl public opinion poll]

[Text] A decisive majority of the Israeli public continues to oppose the participation of the PLO in the peace negotiations, even if the PLO recognizes Israel. No change has occurred in this position over the last 2 years either. This emerges from the nationwide public opinion poll conducted by the Poll Institute and commissioned by HA'ARETZ.

To the question "Are you in favor or opposed to the PLO's participation in the peace negotiations if the PLO recognizes Israel" 63.1 percent answered in the negative (62.9 percent in September 1979, published in HA'ARETZ on 27 September 1979) and 28.2 percent answered in the positive (28.6 percent in September 1979).

Another 3.2 percent (3 percent in September 1979) are prepared to support the PLO's inclusion in the peace negotiations only on condition that the PLO announces that it stops all terrorist activity and gives up the Palestinian charter.

Some 5.5 percent (5.6 percent in September 1979) had no opinion on the matter.

It should be noted that among those who support the PLO's participation in the peace negotiations one finds more of those who belong to the higher socioeconomic population strata. In addition, 33.5 percent of people with higher education, 31.7 percent of people holding academic and administrative positions, 34.2 percent of the higher-income levels and 31.2 percent of people born in Israel support the PLO's inclusion in the peace negotiations.

The poll encompassed a representative sample of 1,200 people.

CSO: 4323/5

## PLAN ORGANIZED TO SURROUND JERICHO WITH JEWISH SETTLEMENT

TA010723 Jerusalem Domestic Service in Hebrew 0505 GMT 1 Jun 81

[Text] The Zionist federation's settlement department is preparing to set up two new settlements near Jericho. To this end a special treasury allocation--totaling 15 million shekels has already been guaranteed. Our settlement affairs correspondent Avraham Ben-Melekh says that three Jewish settlements have recently been established in the Jericho area and the intention is to complete the surrounding of Jericho by Jewish settlement before the Knesset elections.

[Begin recording] The beginning of work in the two new settlements now depends only on the receipt of 15 million shekels that were promised by the Finance Ministry. Bet Ha'arava B is slated to be a Nahal settlement between Jericho and the Jordan River south of Jericho. Na'ama A--officially known as Zori--will be set up north of Jericho. The formal approval for the establishment of the two new settlements have already been given by the appropriate government committees. Now the head of the settlement department, Matityahu Drobles, instructed that the pace of planning and implementation be accelerated. He wants heavy engineering tools on the site before the elections and the start of building roads and preparing the infrastructure. Bet Ha'arava B and Zori are going to join three settlements that have already been set up in the Jericho area: Vered Yeriho, Na'ama and Bet Ha'arava. Together, the new settlement bloc surrounds Jericho on all its sides both in order to link the Jordan Valley settlements with the settlements in the northern Dead Sea area and in order to ultimately cancel the Alon plan which designated the Jericho region for the use of the Jordanians.

The settlement department's planners base the new settlements' economy on agriculture, light industry and tourism. They promise that their next objective in the Jericho area will concentrate on the slopes of Wadi al-Qilt. They also point to site of the old synagogue in (Na'aran) and the springs near it as a new center of tourism and settlement. [end recording]

CSO: 4323/5

## COMMENTATOR CRITICIZES RAID ON IRAQI REACTOR

TA111204 Tel Aviv HA'ARETZ in Hebrew 11 Jun 81 p 9

[Commentary by Matityahu Peled: "Adventure in Baghdad"]

[Excerpts] In another 3 or 4 years, or perhaps even earlier, a new nuclear reactor will be operating in Iraq. That reactor will be protected in such a manner as to rule out any possibility of its being attacked from the air, since there is no doubt that the Iraqis will learn the lesson of the IAF's attack last Sunday. A similar chain of events occurred some years ago in Egypt. After the IAF had humiliated Egypt into the dust by taking advantage of its ineffective antiaircraft network to bomb targets in Cairo, Egypt asked the Russians to organize their air defense system for them. The result was that when the Yom Kippur War broke out, the IAF's planes were unable to operate at all in the Suez Canal area, so that the Egyptian forces crossed the canal unhindered.

The fact that the Iranian Air Force was able to overfly Iraq without any difficulty and bomb the Iraqis' oil facilities, and even the nuclear reactor near Baghdad--not to speak of Baghdad itself--did not push the Iraqi Government to streamline its air defense system. But this show-operation by the IDF which, like the operations against the targets in Cairo during the war of attrition with Egypt, were designed to humiliate the enemy, will generate what the Iranian attacks failed to generate. In another 3 or 4 years it is doubtful whether it will be possible to penetrate the Baghdad region, and certainly there will no longer be any possibility of destroying again the new Iraqi reactor.

At that time the problem the Begin government sought to solve will come up in all its sharpness. Fundamentally, the problem is not that Iraq is seeking to develop the proficiency of its nuclear physicists to the point where they can manufacture nuclear weapons--a proficiency it does not possess today because there are no Iraqi nuclear scientists. The problem is that Israel is recognized as a country that has nuclear potential but that thinks it has the ability and the right to deny this development to its Arab neighbors. Obviously, no Arab country will accept this assumption, and it is doubtful whether anyone else in the world will accept Israel's stand on this issue either.

As is known, Israel did not try to soften the severity of the situation, adamantly refus'ng to sign the nuclear non-proliferation treaty. That refusal

can be interpreted in just one way: Israel wants to preserve for itself a nuclear option.

To develop its nuclear capability, Iraq was aided by France, Portugal, Italy, Brazil and Pakistan. Only international arrangements can, under these conditions, prevent the danger of the use of nuclear weapons. The Israeli Government finds it very difficult to grasp this elementary fact, otherwise it would have long since affiliated itself with the non-proliferation treaty and allowed the international regulatory commission to inspect its nuclear facilities.

But there is another aspect that bears mentioning. Iraq did not behave as Israel did. Iraq signed the treaty, and the reactor it purchased from France was consistent with the details of the treaty. The truth is that there is today no possibility of purchasing reactors that violate the terms of this treaty. Moreover, France, which built the reactor, effectively promised that the reactor would be constructed in a manner consistent with the treaty's terms. We may, if we wish, be skeptical about the effectiveness of these arrangements. But the fact is that the matter was examined by a public committee in France, headed by a man known as a friend of Israel, the Nobel Prize laureate--for physics--Alfred (Kestler). The committee's conclusions, which were published in the French press, were that there was no basis for the Israeli allegations. The Israeli public heard no Israeli reaction to this report, nor was any information made available which could refute its conclusions. Moreover, the international regulatory commission visited the Iraqi reactor and found that there was no violation of the terms of the international treaty.

All these are important considerations. But even if we insist that despite everything it is our security that is at stake and that we cannot trust others in this matter, there was still an untried path open: by affiliating ourselves with the non-proliferation treaty, Israel could demand that both reactors--the Israeli and the Iraqi--be given the same type of international scrutiny, to be carried out in an identical manner by committees whose makeup would be acceptable to both sides. Such a move would contribute much to creating a regime of nuclear disarmament in the Middle East, and would remove the danger Israel so greatly fears.

But Israel did not take this course. Instead, it opted to destroy the Iraqi reactor. That reactor will be rebuilt, and this time perhaps without resort to responsible international elements. As noted, there is no reason to assume that we will be able to level it again, but by that time it is possible that Iraq will have been able to ensure itself nuclear bombs from another source, such as Pakistan. Thus it is far from certain that the Israeli Government has solved the nuclear threat problem. All it has done is further complicate a state of affairs that was already highly complex even without the adventure in Baghdad.



## FINANCE DIRECTOR GENERAL WARNS ABOUT INFLATIONARY EXPLOSION

TA091116 Tel Aviv DAVAR in Hebrew 9 Jun 81 p 1

[Report by the economic correspondent]

[Text] The director general of the Finance Ministry, Prof 'Ezra Sadan, has warned that we are speedily getting closer to what is known as "hyper-inflation." As a result of the current economic policy inflation may reach rates of 300 to 350 percent. This policy will drive us to an inflationary explosion which may burst sooner than expected, Sadan said.

The director general of the Finance Ministry appeared at the end of last week in a closed meeting held at Tel Aviv University to mark the 10th anniversary of the founding of the Institute for Economic Research named after Dr Y. (Perder). The remarks of the director general, including his sharp criticism of Finance Minister Yoram Aridor's current economic policy, aroused astonishment in the audience.

Sadan said that Israel is speedily approaching the situation known as "hyper-inflation." The movement from a rate of inflation of 30 percent a year into a yearly 130 percent inflation takes several years whereas the movement into a rate of inflation of 300 to 350 percent may occur within a few months. Such a move would destroy the economic structure of the state as well as the entire linkage [to the cost of living index] system.

In such a situation [cost of living] adjustments would be made once every 2 weeks, later once a week and even on a daily basis instead of once a month. We would reach a situation where money will be worthless and people would rather opt for a system of bartering goods, Professor Sadan added.

Analyzing the reasons for the current situation, Sadan said the public has been apathetic in the face of the inflation problem because it is protected by various linkage arrangements. Under these circumstances, the political system does not undergo any control. In such a situation every minister sees to it that his own ministry gets a higher nominal budget. Thus, the ministers feel that they receive more than they would have been able to receive otherwise. The director general of the Finance Ministry stated that the current system is speedily rolling toward an "inflationary explosion" which will occur sooner than might have been expected.

Sadan's remarks caused astonishment in the audience. A senior economic official who attended the meeting went as far as sending a note to the initiators of the convention saying: "I hope there are no journalists in the audience."

## BRIEFS

**U.S. MILITARY AID**--Despite the peace agreement with Egypt, the majority of Israel's public opposes a strengthening of Egypt's military might by the United States. This emerges from a countrywide opinion poll conducted by the Pori Institute at the behest of HA'ARETZ. To the question "Do you support or oppose U.S. aid to the strengthening of Egypt's military might through the sale to them of planes and other arms?" 75.5 percent answered in the negative (of whom 53.8 percent are "strongly opposed" and 21.7 percent are "moderately opposed"), as against 17.4 percent answering in the positive (of which 3.8 percent "support strongly" and 13.6 percent "support moderately"). The remaining 7.1 percent have no opinion on the subject. Among the objectors to the supply of U.S. arms to Egypt are more prominent members of socioeconomically less advanced classes in the population, whereas among the supporters of U.S. arms supply to Egypt there are more persons belonging to more advanced classes in the population. The poll encompassed a representative crosscut of 1,200 men and women, who were interviewed in private interviews throughout the country. [Text] [TA031213 Tel Aviv HA'ARETZ in Hebrew 3 Jun 81 p 3]

**LOAN FROM COMMERCIAL BANKS**--In May the treasury borrowed the large sum of 870 million shekels in order to present to the public a "relatively low" monetary infusion of 900 million shekels. A HA'ARETZ correspondent has learned that the finance minister demanded that the heads of his office prevent an infusion at almost any cost. Last week HA'ARETZ revealed that, following Mr Aridor's directives, the accountant-general is postponing payments without any clear criteria. The directives given were general and absolute, with only the defence establishment excused from the payment freeze due to the relative alert on the Lebanese order. Because of the increased expenditure to the defense establishment and the huge expenses for subsidies, Finance Ministry officials came to the conclusion that the infusion might reach the unprecedented sum of 2 billion shekels. Following instructions from the minister, treasury director General Prof 'Ezra Sadan entered into negotiations with the large banks, at the end of which Bank Leumi agreed to lend the treasury 600 million shekels and the discount bank 250 million. Bank Hapoalim consented to a mere 20 million shekels. [Excerpt] [TA030854 Tel Aviv HA'ARETZ in Hebrew 3 Jun 81 p 1]

**NEW GAZA PAPER**--Preparations are being completed in the Gaza Strip for the publication of a big new newspaper called AL-HUDAH which will express Gaza Mayor Rashad al-Shawwa's views. A modern printing house has already been set up in Gaza to this end. The printing house will enable Rashad al-Shawwa to publish his paper in an impressive, eye-catching manner. The paper will be financed by Jordan and the PLO jointly and it is supposed to serve as a counter-weight to the East Jerusalem Arab papers which usually express the views of the National Guidance Committee. [Text] [TA021136 Jerusalem Domestic Service in Hebrew 1100 GMT 2 Jun 81]

**GOVERNMENT EXPENSES**--In the first months of this fiscal year, beginning 1 April 1981, there was a steep increase in the excess government demand over supply. This is to say that the regular outlays have markedly risen compared to the regular income. This process directly influences the rate of inflation. Between April and May, the excess demand over the supply reached 4.5 billion Israeli shekels, a sum that is 3 times from the original planning. The reason for the excess demand is the increase in subsidies for the basic commodities, outlays in the areas of energy and defense as well as the heavy expenditure on paying the salaries and cost of living increments. Income tax collection went down during this period due to the revenue workers' sanctions and also because of a halt in the rate of importing. [TA060750 Jerusalem Domestic Service in Hebrew 1100 GMT 4 Jun 81 TA]

**IMMIGRATION IN MAY**--Some 880 immigrants and 38 Israeli expatriates returned to Israel in May. There was a 37-percent increase in the number of immigrants arriving in Israel from the Soviet Union compared to April. Some 278 immigrants arrived from Eastern Europe. There was also an increase in the number of immigrants from North America but there was a drop in the number of immigrants from Western Europe--only 188 persons. [Tel Aviv ITIM in Hebrew 1415 GMT 5 Jun 81 TA]

**SHEKEL DEVALUATION**--In the first 5 months of 1981 the shekel was devalued by 43 percent against the U.S. dollar, by 24 percent against the pound sterling, by 18 percent against the Dutch gilden, by 30 percent against the Japanese yen and by 15 percent against the Italian lira. [TA060752 Tel Aviv DAVAR in Hebrew 5 Jun 81 p 4 TA]

**UNEMPLOYMENT IN MAY**--According to data supplied by the Statistics Department of the employment service, the number of persons seeking employment in May increased by 12.5 percent and totaled 36,157 compared to 32,192 in April. [TA060752 Tel Aviv DAVAR in Hebrew 5 Jun 81 p 4 TA]

**EGYPTIAN RESEARCH BOOKS BANNED**--The military government's general staff headquarters officer in charge of educational affairs has banned the use of another list of research books--this time, books published in Egypt including the foundations of physical geography, Arab unity, Jewish religious law and books of poetry. The ITIM correspondents in Judea and Samaria reports that these books contain incitement against Israel by distorting facts. [Text] [TA050939 Jerusalem Domestic Service in Hebrew 0900 GMT 5 Jun 81]

WEST BANK SETTLEMENTS--Three new settlements in Samaria will be inhabited this month and two more next month. In addition, three urban centers and two settlements--on which work was frozen in the wake of appeals filed by Arabs who claim ownership of the land in question--are under construction. The settlements to be inhabited this month are: Shaqed, in northern Samaria; Ma'ale 'Amos (Tego'a B) in Judeaa (which will be populated by penitents from the "Esh Hatora" Yeshiva--including also, apparently, Uri Zohar [a well-known local entertainer who became religious and left the entertainment world] and Mikhmarsh, on the Allon Road. The two settlements to be inhabited next month are Na'ale (Nili) in the Modi'in bloc and Yaqir B (Barqan) in the heart of Samaria on the Samaria transverse road. According to the settlement department of the World Zionist Organization, which is building these settlements, all five of them as well as the two settlements on which work was frozen in the wake of the Arabs' appeal (Mizpe Guvrin and Shave Shomron B) are among the ten last settlements whose establishment was announced over 6 months ago by Prime Minister Menahem Begin. [Text] [TA021149 Tel Aviv MA'ARIV in Hebrew 2 Jun 81 p 3]

CSO: 4323/5



## PROSPECTS FOR WAR IN MIDDLE EAST DISCUSSED

### Possibilities for War Increasing

London AL-MAJALLAH in Arabic 16-22 May 81 pp 15-16

[Interview with Dr 'Adid Dawishah, expert on Middle East Affairs at the Royal Institute for International Affairs in London; date and place of interview not given]

[Text] Dr Dawishah tells AL-MAJALLAH that prospects for war between Syria and Israel are greater than they were a few years ago.

Dr 'Adid Dawishah is an expert on Middle East affairs at the Royal Institute of International Affairs in London. During this interview with AL-MAJALLAH he expressed his pessimism regarding the development of the current crisis between Syria and Israel. He also emphasized that he was pessimistic regarding a solution to the Lebanese crisis.

[Question] Is there a serious possibility at the present time that a Syrian-Israeli war may break out?

[Answer] There is always a possibility that such a war will break out because the Middle East area is more tense and more dangerous than any other area. There are numerous ideological, political and strategic reasons for this. In addition, the superpowers have intervened directly into the conditions of the area. But as far as the present crisis in particular is concerned, there are factors that are helping set off the dispute and, at the same time, there are other factors that are aiming at calming things down.

Israel is now facing a crisis regarding the peace negotiations with Egypt. This crisis will definitely make it hesitate to embark upon a war with Syria because such a war would force President al-Sadat to choose between upholding the Camp David treaty or going back to supporting an Arab state in its war with Israel. From this respect and if we bear in mind the fact that Israel is now getting ready to hold general elections, it may be said

that this would not be the suitable time according to Israeli considerations for starting a war in the area. However, there are other factors as far as Israel is concerned: there is a large group in the Israeli army which thinks that, quite the contrary, a war under these circumstances would achieve gains for Israel for internal political reasons. Such a war would assure Menahem Begin of victory in the coming elections. A limited war with Syria would cause the Israeli people to rally around the Likud bloc.

[Question] What is your view of Syrian considerations regarding the possibility of entering into a war under these circumstances?

[Answer] The Syrians too are facing factors that are pushing them toward war and other factors that are causing them to waver. It would be difficult for Syria to achieve a military balance by itself in its war with Israel. But the participation of Iraq and Jordan, for example, in such a war with the Syrian front can achieve such a balance. However, this matter requires that there be a single front as well as a common military command and plan for the war as was the case in 1973 between the Egyptian and the Syrian armies. But such planning does not take place overnight; and the Syrians themselves have stressed this. President al-Asad and Minister Khaddam have repeatedly indicated that they were not prepared to embark on a war with Israel unless they could do so under circumstances that would allow them to achieve victory in such a war.

[Question] But the mutual contradiction of the Syrian and Israeli positions regarding the missiles crisis does not allow the two parties many options. The Syrians are adamant about keeping their missiles in the al-Biqa' area, and Israel is insisting that they be withdrawn. Where can such a mutual contradiction lead?

[Answer] This is one of the aspects of the crisis that makes me more anxious than at any other time in the past in view of the current situation. This is because the commitment to the positions of both parties is such that it has become difficult for both parties to maneuver. The Syrian position is evident with regard to Lebanon. The Syrians will not permit the partitioning of Lebanon, and they will not permit any faction in Lebanon to score a victory over another faction. They will also not allow the existing alliance between the Phalangist party and Israel to continue. Any retreat from these firm positions will affect the Syrians politically and strategically. The attempt to achieve a reconciliation between the Syrian and Israeli positions regarding Lebanon has become very difficult because any compromise by any one of the two parties in its positions signifies that not only has the party abandoned its strategy in Lebanon, but that it had also abandoned its strategy in the entire Middle East crisis. Therefore I believe that the possibility for a war now between Syria and Israel is greater than it was 1 or 2 years ago, or even when the Syrians entered Lebanon in 1976.

## Like the Gulf War

[Question] Do you believe that the efforts of the two superpowers to resolve this crisis can have a positive outcome?

[Answer] Leaving Syria and Israel alone now would undoubtedly increase the prospects for war between them. In one form or another the situation between the two countries is similar to that which existed between Iraq and Iran prior to their war last fall. War does not serve the interests of either one of the parties, but the adherence to invariable political positions and the deterioration of the military situation are leading to a situation in which avoiding war will be difficult. Therefore, I think that the only way this deterioration can be stopped is to have the two superpowers exert pressure on their allies in the area. However, this pressure must be very great so as to yield results. This is due to the mutual contradiction in the positions of the parties to the dispute.

[Question] There is talk in Israeli circles about the fact that the United States is trying to settle the Syrian-Israeli dispute by ensuring political and security gains for Syria in Lebanon in return for Syria's agreement to participate in one form or another in the efforts that are being made to achieve peace in the Middle East. Do you believe that a settlement of this kind can be acceptable to the Syrians?

[Answer] Negotiations around this subject must definitely be held in secret if it is true that such a plan does in fact exist. It is difficult for me to believe that there is such a U.S. plan. The Syrians will not accept an Israeli presence in south Lebanon, in the Golan or in the West Bank. Therefore, it is impossible for the Syrians to approve of the status quo in south Lebanon. What I know about the current positions of the Syrian leadership allows me to affirm that any settlement with Syria along the lines of Camp David or in any other way is not at all imminent on the part of the Syrians.

[Question] In view of this [situation], what is your evaluation of the nature of Syrian-U.S. relations?

[Answer] Relations between Syria and the United States are tied to U.S. policy toward the Middle East and especially with regard to U.S. policy toward Israel and the future of the West Bank. As long as the United States supports the Camp David accords, which the Syrians regard as an international conspiracy against them and their allies in the area, relations between Damascus and Washington will not improve. But if the present administration changes its policy toward Camp David and initiates a new plan to achieve a comprehensive peace in the area, the condition of these relations may change. The present crisis between Syria and the United States is not an ideological crisis; it is the result of Syria's conviction that the U.S. government is acting against its [Syria's] interests in the area and against the rights of Palestinians. Syrian-U.S. relations had begun to improve after 1973, but they deteriorated again after the Sinai agreement between Egypt and the United States was signed. Therefore the

improvement in Syrian-U.S. relations now depends on the will of the United States more than it does on Syria's desire for improved relations.

[Question] Is it possible that any political settlement of the present crisis between Syria and Israel would lead to a solution of the crisis of Lebanon itself?

[Answer] No. Lebanon's greatest tragedy is the fact that the Syrian intervention which was supposed to have led to peace has also become part of the problem. It is this that has made the Lebanese situation more complicated than it was before. The crisis the Syrians are facing regarding Lebanon is that, on the one hand, they are facing a difficult situation if they want to stay and, on the other hand, they cannot withdraw because of the positions to which they had committed themselves vis a vis the Lebanese crisis. They had committed themselves to preserve the unity of the country and to prevent the partitioning of Lebanon. I do not hide the fact that I am very pessimistic regarding any possibility for a solution to the Lebanese crisis. The situation will remain the same for at least the next 6 years; [Lebanon will have] the same problems and the same parties to the dispute.

#### Syrian-Israeli War Unlikely

London AL-MAJALLAH in Arabic 16-22 May 81 pp 16-17

[Interview with Gen Robert Elliott, expert on Middle East affairs at the Institute of Strategic Studies; date and place of interview not given]

[Text] Gen Elliott tells AL-MAJALLAH, "There will be no war between Syria and Israel. The solution lies in having the two countries return to their borders."

In this interview with Gen Robert Elliott, the expert on Middle East affairs at the Institute of Strategic Studies expresses his optimism that the current crisis between Syria and Israel over the question of the Syrian missiles in the area of al-Biqa' will be settled. The text of the interview follows.

[Question] Do you believe that the present confrontation between Syria and Israel over the Syrian SAM missiles in the area of al-Biqa' could turn into a state of war between the two countries?

[Answer] I believe that neither one of these two countries wants this war. A war is not in the interests of either one of the two countries at this time. On the Israeli side there is no doubt that Begin would achieve political gains from any war because a war would unite the Israeli people behind his command. However, such an adventure may lead to losses and may have negative results regarding Israel's relations with its friends in Europe and in the United States. This is one of the reasons that will force the Israeli government to maintain the peace. Begin is naturally subject to strong pressures from the "hawks" in the military



command to deal a blow to Syria at this time because they believe that Syria is in a state of isolation in the Arab world. They [also] believe that this blow would put an end to Syria's military power. At the same time those military men think that war has to be the last option [for Israel] after other diplomatic and political choices [are exhausted] because if an Israeli attack on Syria were to take place, the Arab world would unite behind Syria since it would be the victim of Israeli aggression.

[Question] But despite all these Israeli considerations there is the clear position declared by Begin [who said] that he will not tolerate having the SAM missiles remain in Lebanon. There is also the clear Syrian position which is adamant about these missiles remaining [in Lebanon] to counter Israeli aggressions. Where will this mutual contradiction lead?

[Answer] As far as I know the SAM missiles are in the area where the Arab deterrent forces are stationed. This is a natural defensive step undertaken by a command that has been exposed to numerous Israeli attacks. The Syrian missiles entered Lebanon openly on trucks. They are also stationed on a public road. Therefore, it is my opinion that the step which the Syrians took is a symbolic one. It is more of a clear indication of Syria's political position than it is a military operation.

[Question] If U.S. and Soviet efforts with the parties to the dispute failed to resolve this crisis, what do you think the results of a war between Syria and Israel would be at this time?

[Answer] Such a view forces me to believe that war will take place, but I think there are numerous pressures on the two parties: not only is there pressure from the superpowers, but there are also the pressures of reality. The greatest crisis facing Syria is that it will expose itself to opposing Israeli military strength. Even if the Arabs were to support Syria in the war, the Israeli lethal blow could be swifter. The Israelis can repeat what they did in 1967, that is, they can act as swiftly as possible to do away with the Syria air force. This will naturally be more difficult this time because of the progress that has taken place in the training of the Syrian army and because the Syrians obtained the advanced Soviet SAM missiles. However, the problem that remains is that of early warning and surveillance devices. Therefore, it will be difficult for Syria to oppose a surprise attack.

[Question] How would you compare the military power of the Arab countries to that of Israel at the present time?

[Answer] The military power of both parties has advanced considerably over what it was in 1967 or in 1973 for example. But the superiority which Israel still has pertains to the development of its military training. I believe that this situation is in the interests of the Israeli army. In any confrontation Israel will undoubtedly have to go after some kind of short-range war or a swift strike. Even if the other Arab countries were

to decide to support Syria, such support takes time and also requires a joint military command and standardized military plans.

### The Greatest Problem

[Question] In view of this fact how do you explain the inflexibility of the Syrian position regarding the question of the SAM missiles?

[Answer] One of the greatest problems that Syria is facing now is the fact that the Arab deterrent force, which entered Lebanon to preserve the peace, was unable to realize [its objective] fully. With time and for various reasons the deterrent force turned into a Syrian force. This problem does in fact eliminate the harmony and the effectiveness of these troops, and it also turns the deterrent forces into part of the problem. Naturally this does not mean that what has become a habit with Israel of flying its aircraft in Lebanese air space, shelling Palestinian camps and killing civilians be overlooked. The area where Syria has placed its missiles does not threaten Israel in any way; nor is it connected with the area which Israel claims poses a threat to it, that is, south of the Litani River.

[Question] What the Syrians are saying is that the area where they placed the missiles, that is, the area of al-Biq'a', is an area that constitutes part of Syrian security. What are the implications of this position?

[Answer] I believe that if the Syrian and the Israeli parties were to go back to their borders and if there were a neutral land between them, which in fact will be the territory of Lebanon itself, this situation could lead to the onset of a reasonable solution. This situation existed before 1970, that is, before the entry of the Palestinian forces into Lebanon following the battles of Jordan. This naturally requires that Lebanon have a strong, homogeneous government, and it also requires an inclination toward the establishment of a Palestinian state. There is no logic that can contradict or dispute this [solution].

[Question] What is your evaluation of the Soviet position on the fact that the Syrians placed their missiles in Lebanon?

[Answer] I do not believe that Moscow had knowledge of this decision. This was a Syrian decision 100 percent. The Syrians made that decision for two reasons: first, to defend their forces in the area of al-Biq'a' and in other areas. The second reason is a political reason: it is an indication that they will not permit Israel to continue its aggression indefinitely on their air force and on Lebanese territory. We must not forget that the reason that led to the introduction of these missiles into Lebanon was the fact that Israel did shoot down two Syrian helicopters.

[Question] Can the diplomatic efforts that are being made by the United States and the Soviet Union stop the outbreak [of hostilities] between the two countries at the present time?

[Answer] The last thing that the United States and the Soviet Union want is to be forced into a state of war in the Middle East. This has been the danger in this area since 1948. The two superpowers have allies in the area, but in fact, they have no direct supervision over those allies. Nevertheless, the U.S. and Soviet governments will not permit this situation to deteriorate into a state of war. I believe that they will go as far as putting their alliances in the area on the line for the purpose of preventing this war.

[Question] In view of this evaluation, how do you see the end of the missiles crisis between Syria and Israel? Will Syria agree to withdraw its missiles from Lebanon?

[Answer] I am placing great hopes on the outcome of the tour in the area by U.S. envoy Philip Habib as well as on the Soviet envoy to Syria. I believe that ultimately the missiles can be withdrawn in a manner that would not embarrass the Syrians; I believe they can be withdrawn under the terms of a political agreement. Thus this problem can be solved, but the more difficult problem which will remain unsolved will be what will Lebanon's future be after that?

8592

CSO: 4802/733

COUNTRY SEEN AS 'INDIRECT VICTIM' OF SAHARA WAR

Paris LE POINT in French 11 May 81 pp 88-89

[Article by Mireille Duteil "A Desert Whirlwind"]

[Text] The sick man of the Sahara, Mauritania, has great difficulty in avoiding the cupidity of its powerful neighbors: Morocco, Algeria, and above all the Libya of Colonel Qadhafi.

All eyes are fixed on Nouakchott, from the Atlantic to the Persian Gulf. Rabat, Algiers, Tripoli, Baghdad, Riyadh watch over Mauritania, with a self-interested kind of solicitude. Not that its sand dunes conceal unexpected riches but because they hold, in part, the key to the Sahara conflict.

Tossed about between these contradictory influences, the country of the blue men tries to survive by maintaining a certain neutrality in the war of the sands. That does not protect it from the turbulence. During these last two months a bloody, attempted coup d'etat and then an unexpected visit by the Libyan leader won out over the first civilian government of the postwar period. The soldiers have returned to power.

A fatalist, the average Mauritanian sits up attentively. Leaving for the moment his game of dhamet, the national favorite and a kind of chess played on the sand of the sidewalks, with shells in place of pawns, Mjjoub recalls that, during the last few weeks, he has seen the visit of an Iraqi vice president; the president of Senegal, Abdou Diouf; the president of Mali, Moussa Traore; the French secretary of state for foreign affairs, Olivier Stirn; a Saudi visitor whom he no longer recalls very well; and last but not least, Col Qadhafi. A real diplomatic whirlwind in this desert of sand.

The reason for all this coming and going? It is the five-year-old war in the Western Sahara between Morocco and the POLISARIO Front, supported by Algeria and Libya, a war of which Mauritania continues to be the indirect victim. Certainly, Nouakchott officially retired from the conflict in August, 1979, by signing a peace agreement in Algiers with the POLISARIO Front. The Mauritanian Army then returned to its barracks, but the sound of boots on the frontier continues to set the rhythm of the political life of the country. The acres of Mauritanian sand, nine-tenths uninhabited, divided among the Bidanes (Moors) and the Black Africans, principally



grouped in the south on the fertile banks of the Senegal River, are the object of the pressures of their powerful neighbors to the north (Morocco, Algeria) and of their respective allies (Iraq and Saudi Arabia on one side and Libya on the other), who haggle over their petrodollars. This country, which is perhaps a state, but is not yet a nation, has become the soft underbelly of the Saharan conflict.

Each camp does not lack friends within the country and tries to influence the government in its favor. Businessmen and feudal leaders are often linked by ancestral commercial and cultural currents to the sherifian monarchy. For their part the Sahraoui of the POLISARIO Front, most of them of the R'guibat tribe, can claim many links with the R'guibat tribe of Mauritania, even within the very heart of the government. Even if they have identical customs, the same kind of blue or white shawls [boubou], and a common language--Hassania--these are not enough to make all the Moors into Sahraoui.

"Mauritania has thrown itself wholeheartedly into the Arab game," a Western diplomat sighs. Nouakchott, a tan and gray city which emerged from the sand 20 years ago, has become a steaming stew of culture where pro-Moroccan, pro-Sahraoui, pro-Iraqi, pro-Libyan, and pro-Algerian factions compete. In the low houses of the capital, in the bush country, under the tents, around the three traditional little glasses of burning hot tea--the first bitter as life, the second strong as love, the third soft as death, as the old saying goes--alliances are made and broken. One clan puts the other to retreat after long, silent clashes, in the Mauritanian style.

Thus, when on 16 March about a dozen opposition members who had taken refuge in Morocco and France tried to seize power by force, Nouakchott immediately accused Morocco of being behind the attackers. It broke diplomatic relations with Rabat.

It is true that the attackers, members of the Alliance for a Democratic Mauritania (AMD), felt close to Morocco. Had the coup succeeded, Rabat could have breathed easily. Its fear of seeing Mauritanian territory converted into a sanctuary for the Polisario Front, from which raids against the Moroccan Army would be launched, could have faded away.

Nouakchott was afraid on 16 March. It feared that the failed attempted coup would be paralleled by a Moroccan attack on its northern frontier, on the border of Western Sahara.

In this situation the Mauritanian civilian government, in full disarray, turned toward its other neighbors to the north, Algeria and Libya. Algeria was the first to respond to the Nouakchott appeal. Beginning on 17 March, Algiers sent military supplies. For a week, 24 Antonov-12 aircraft unloaded anti-aircraft equipment in Nouakchott and especially in Nouadhibou, the economic lungs of the country on the Sahara frontier. "We preferred to provide arms to avoid the possibility that others would give it," was the whisper on the Algerian side. Others? Libya, of course. Algiers would only suffer from a Mauritania which had become a pawn of Colonel Qadhafi and which could give shelter to a Polisario Front, thus out of Algeria's control.

Taking advantage of Mauritanian weakness, Qadhafi in turn entered on the scene. However, the "brother colonel" perhaps moved a bit quickly. On 13 April, receiving

in Tripoli the Mauritanian prime minister, Sid Ahmed Ould Bneijara, he proposed to him the formation of a union between Mauritania and the Democratic Sahraoui Arab Republic (DSAR), which is not recognized by Nouakchott. Accepting meant benefiting from Libyan aid, but it certainly meant throwing himself into a war with Morocco and risking civil war in Mauritania. The Mauritanian official was very careful in responding. If he was caught in a trap by Qadhdhafi, how would some people look at him?

However this may be, the Libyan "trap" closed on Nouakchott on Easter Sunday. Early in the morning the authorities learned that Qadhdhafi, on a visit to Algiers, intended to push on to the Atlantic Ocean. Would he arrive at noon, at 1400, at 1600? No one knew. The radio station issued calls for a meeting of the leaders of the country. The diplomats, who were at the beach--a sandstorm had ended--pulled at their ears and turned pale. At 1800 on Sunday [19 April] Mu'ammarr Qadhdhafi, lord of the desert, descended from a Boeing aircraft accompanied by 140 people, including 112 bodyguards who came in two other aircraft. The Mauritanian embarrassment was evident. The guest did not have a good reputation. However, Moorish hospitality asserted itself, and Qadhdhafi, an unwelcome guest, is also a powerful and rich leader.

Upon his arrival at the airport the Libyan colonel announced the tenor of the visit. He repeated his proposal for a union with the Polisario state. He suggested a pact between the progressive countries of the region--Libya, Algeria, the DSAR, and Mauritania. He invited Nouakchott to join the "firmness front," which includes the "Lardliner" of the Arab world. President Haidalla took refuge behind the collegial structure of the CMSN (Military Committee of National Salvation), which constitutes the legislative power of Mauritania until a constitution is voted on. "That won't do," reportedly said Qadhdhafi, "assemble the CMSN for me. I am going to talk to them." Acting as a bloc, the military officers in the CMSN politely listened to "the crazy little boy," as he is called in the Arab world, and promised to reflect on his proposals. God be praised! Qadhdhafi had obtained nothing. He left exactly as he had arrived, 48 hours later.

In December, 1979, Haidalla had already refused the weapons and soldiers which Qadhdhafi wished to put at his disposal to throw out a Mauritania the Moroccan troops stationed there. "We don't want foreign troops on our territory. That, moreover, raises problems with certain countries which propose to aid us," Ould Zamel, minister of foreign affairs in the late civilian government, told me. In April Mauritania had become less concerned. A first Antonov aircraft in Libyan colors unloaded military materiel in Nouakchott on 25 April. A second Antonov followed, three days later. However, the aid from "fraternal" countries is not always disinterested. Following the events of 16 March, the second-ranking Iraqi leader brought \$15 million, but he pleaded as firmly for a rapid reconciliation with Morocco. Iraq supports Rabat on the Saharan problem. On 25 April it was a Saudi minister who arrived, following the tracks of Qadhdhafi. He proposed resuming a form of cooperation which had been out of use since the peace agreement with the POLISARIO Front.

"Libya will never be able to replace the Iraqi or Saudi petrodollars," a Mauritanian commented in a disillusioned tone. He had no particular preference for Libyan socialism, but he was afraid.

"We have decided not to let things just happen to us any more," said Navy Lt Dahane Ould Ahmed Mahmoud, the new minister of foreign affairs. In 24 hours the change became visible to the naked eye from the flower-decorated patio of the Ministry. With their Kalachnikov rifles slung over their shoulders, soldiers were guarding the reception room of the minister.

In the hills of the "Great North" the Mauritanian Army was patrolling in oases where no one had dared to go for many years. "We will tighten the screws to prevent incursions by the POLISARIO guerrillas," said Colonel Yall following the events of 16 March. He is now the chief of the general staff. When, a few weeks afterwards, elements of the POLISARIO Front arrived in an R'guibat camp east of Zourrate and gave the order to a whole family to follow them into the Sahara, a unit of the Mauritanian Army went after them and brought the nomads back.

Nouakchott seems determined to control its territory. It is about time it did so.

5170

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DUBAI AIR TRAFFIC FIGURES SHOW INCREASE

Dubai AL-BAYAN in Arabic 9 May 81 p 4

[Article: "Statistics on Dubai International Airport Traffic Reveal: Passenger Traffic Reaches 736,000 for 3-Month Period; Air Freight Reaches 15 Million Kilograms"]

[Text] There were 736,444 arriving, departing, and transit passengers at Dubai International Airport during the first 3 months of this year. This is an increase of 14 percent over the same period of last year.

The volume of air freight during this period reached 15.397 million kilograms, up 35 percent over the same period of last year.

January was the heaviest of the 3 months with 268,104 departing passengers, an increase of some 26 percent over January of last year. The average number of passengers per day in January was 8,648. February was the lightest of the 3 months. March had the heaviest volume of air freight with 6,151,765 kilograms, up 42 percent over March of last year. The average daily volume of freight during March was 134,477 kilograms.

A statistical report on traffic at Dubai Airport during the past 3 months indicated that 14,392 flights landed at Dubai International Airport during this period. Some 8,367 of these were regularly scheduled flights and 3,973 were nonscheduled flights.

The report stated that there were 196,516 departing passengers during the first quarter of this year, representing an increase of 21 percent over the same period of last year.

March was the heaviest month for departing passengers with 71,298 departures, up 28 percent over March of last year. The average daily number of departing passengers during March was 2,300.

The report indicated that there were 225,385 passenger arrivals during the first quarter of this year, representing an increase of 24 percent over the same period last year.

January was the heaviest month in this category with 74,624 arriving passengers, an increase of 25.61 percent over January of last year. The average daily number of arrivals during January was 2,407.



The report mentioned that the number of transit passengers during the same period was 331,343, representing an average increase of 11 percent over the same period of last year.

The month of January was the heaviest of the 3 months in terms of the number of transit passengers with 124,925, up 16 percent over the same month of last year. The average daily number of transit passengers was 4,000.

The report said that the volume of incoming air freight during the first quarter of the year was 12,029,522 kilograms, an increase of 40 percent over the same period of last year during which the volume of air freight was 8,555,494 kilograms.

March was the heaviest of the 3 months in volume of incoming air freight with 4,824,599 kilograms, up 52 percent over March of last year. The average daily volume of incoming air freight was 155,232 kilograms. The volume of outgoing air freight during the first 3 months of the year was 3,367,923 kilograms, representing an average increase of 25 percent over the same period of last year. March had the largest volume of outgoing air freight with 1,328,000 [kilograms], an increase of 14 percent over the same month of last year. The average daily volume of outgoing freight during March was 43,000 kilograms.

The report indicated that March was the heaviest of the 3 months in the number of planes which conducted flights via Dubai Airport. There were 5,107 such flights, of which 2,882 were regularly scheduled flights and 339 were nonscheduled flights.

8591

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STATUS REPORT ON INVESTMENT PROJECTS

Dubai AL-BAYAN in Arabic 9 May 81 p 2

[Article: "Implementation of 70 Percent of the 1980 Investment Program; Some 740 Million Dirhams in Expenditures, Up 13 Percent; Some 1,037 Popular Housing Units Now Under Construction"]

[Text] Expenditures for the investment program for projects implemented by the Ministry of Public Works and Housing during 1980 reached 740 million dirhams out of the program's total authorizations of 1,047 million dirhams. This represents 70 percent of the authorized expenditures, up 13 percent over the 1979 figure.

This information appeared in the ministry's annual report, which stated that investments for school buildings during the 9-year period from 1972 to 1980 totaled 650 million dirhams, including construction of 17 kindergartens, 64 elementary schools, 17 intermediate schools, 3 secondary schools, 3 vocational schools, and 5 boarding sections.

The report said that expenditures on Ministry of Health projects during 1980 totaled approximately 78 million dirhams while expenditures during the past 9 years totaled 283 million dirhams. A number of projects were implemented during this period, including construction of the 'Ajman hospital, the Dubai hospital, 29 out-patient clinics, 3 school health clinics, 6 health centers, and 6 dwelling units for the Nursing Administration.

With regard to the Ministry of Justice, [Islamic Affairs and Religious Trusts] the report indicated that 63 mosques were completed, 15 mosques are currently under construction, and preparations are being made to build 22 additional mosques in various areas of the state.

The ministry is currently constructing the Ministry of Justice and Islamic Affairs building and the Federal Supreme Court building in Abu Dhabi as well as preparing to construct nine courthouses in the principal cities.

Concerning the Ministry of the Interior, the report of the Ministry of Public Works stated that the total amount expended on Interior Ministry projects during the past 9 years, including police stations, coast guard stations, and barracks, was 174 million dirhams. These projects included 2 police stations, 3 coast guard buildings, 3 fire stations, 5 buildings for Citizenship Office branches, and 2 passport centers as well as 15 other miscellaneous projects.

Projects currently under construction include a radio school and a general headquarters building for Emigration and Passports in Abu Dhabi, a school for armed police recruits in Sharjah, and a building for the Emigration and Citizenship Office in Dubai.

#### Agricultural Projects

The report stated that expenditures on agricultural projects during the same period totaled some 26 million dirhams. These projects included 17 agricultural and veterinary guidance centers and 8 marine workshops. Projects currently under completion include nine agricultural and veterinary quarantine stations and four clinics. In addition, the central laboratory for water and soil research has been completed in the city of al-'Ayn with preliminary costs of approximately 17 million dirhams.

With regard to the Ministry of Labor and Social Affairs, the report said that the Ministry of Public Works constructed nine offices for the Labor Ministry in the principal cities. In addition, several social centers are currently under completion.

During the same period, the ministry also constructed five central post offices and work is currently in progress on five branch offices in various parts of the state.

#### Public Utilities and Housing

With regard to projects in the public utilities sector, the report said that the ministry completed 710 kilometers of roads from 1972 to 1980 at a total cost of 806 million dirhams. An additional 80 kilometers is currently under completion.

Concerning the housing sector, the report stated that the Ministry of Public Works constructed 4,569 popular housing units from 1972 to 1980. These units have been distributed to the citizens. An additional 1,037 housing units are currently under construction.

8591  
CSO: 4802/705

STUDY CALLS FOR CONTINUED INCREASE IN NUMBER OF WORKING WOMEN

Dubai AL-BAYAN in Arabic 6 May 81 p 2

[Article by 'Ali Ibrahim: "Women in UAE Have 50 Percent Share of Population and 5.5 Percent Share of Economy; Federation of Chambers of Commerce: Male Workers Number 606,000, Female Workers in 1981 Number 33,350"]

[Text] A recent study by the state's Federation of Chambers of Commerce and Industry projected that the percentage of women in the economically active population of the UAE will increase from 3.3 percent to 5.5 percent this year.

The study pointed out that this percentage is low compared to some of the other Gulf societies such as Kuwait, which has 11 percent, but higher than Qatar and Saudi Arabia, where the figure is 2.2 percent.

The study, which was prepared by Dr Muhammad Kamil Rihan, associate professor of economics at the University of the UAE, and was cited in the periodical journal of the federation, stated that the total labor force in the UAE is expected to increase to 606,000 during 1981. This represents an increase of 419 percent over 1972. The study anticipated that the total labor force will increase to around 762,000 workers by 1985, representing an increase of 526 percent over 1972.

Some 33,350 [Female] Workers

The study, which discussed the role of women in UAE society, said that the female labor force stood at 3,680 workers in 1972 and had increased to 9,790 workers by 1975, representing an increase of 266 percent. The figure continued to climb from this point, reaching approximately 19,400 female workers in 1977.

The female labor force is expected to reach 33,350 this year and 59,450 by 1985.

In percentage terms, the participation of women in the labor force will reach 5.5 percent in 1981 and 7.8 percent in 1985 compared to 3.3 percent in 1975 and 1.8 percent in 1968.

Share of the National Product

With regard to working women's share of the country's national product, the study projected that the total national product will reach 99.4 billion dirhams in 1982



and 130 billion dirhams in 1985, of which women will account for 3.7 billion dirhams and 5.3 billion dirhams, respectively.

The study said that the conclusions arrived at indicate that a 1-percent increase in the percentage of the total population which is economically active causes an increase of \$249 in the average per capita income.

A 1-percent increase in the percentage of economically active women in the population causes a corresponding increase of about \$153.40 in the average per capita income.

The study observed that while Arab women today are demanding participation in economic development plans, it has verified the necessity of this demand for the Gulf states in general and the UAE in particular because of the fact that demographically women represent half of society while they participate only to a very small extent in economic development projects.

However, this fact should not detract from their role in confronting other basic requirements, which may be more important than their economic role.

In spite of all this, the small size of the population in the UAE, on the one hand, and its reliance on imported labor, on the other, dictate that women must assume their role in the economic development which the state is presently undergoing. This requires that attention be focused on the education of women.

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DUBAI BECOMING BANKING, INSURANCE CENTER

Dubai AL-BAYAN in Arabic 8 May 81 p 2

[Article by 'Ali Ibrahim: "Dubai Becoming Banking 'Center'; Some 120 Branches and Main Offices and 45 Insurance Companies as of 1980"]

[Text] As of the end of 1980, there were 51 banks operating in Dubai with 120 main offices and branches offering varied banking and financial services.

A recent report on economic activity in the emirate stated that in the insurance sector, Dubai currently has some 45 main offices or branches of large domestic and international insurance companies offering all kinds of insurance services.

The report pointed out that such a large number of banks and branch banks in a relatively small city such as Dubai might seem somewhat surprising at first. However, as a thriving city, Dubai is capable of ensuring sufficient operations for a large number of these banks.

Financial and commercial activity in the emirate is bringing about the opening of additional banks, with a number of large international banks currently constructing main offices in the city.

It should be mentioned that one of the most important factors promoting the increase in financial and commercial activity in the city is the completion of all the infrastructural facilities and essential services, particularly in the communications sector.

Official statistics in this connection indicate that there were 70,000 telephone lines installed in Dubai as of the end of 1980 as well as 2,000 telex lines. Subscribers can communicate directly with most areas of the world from Dubai through the satellite station in Jabal 'Ali.

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CSO: 4802/705

ECONOMIC STAGNATION DISCUSSED

Paris AL-NAHAR AL-'ARABI WA AL-DUWALI in Arabic 25 Apr 81 pp 60-61

[Article by 'Afif al-Razzaz: "Idle Investments; Foreign Currencies and Real Estate Secure Easy Profits and Cause Industrial Projects to Disappear"]

[Text] There is in the UAE a new crisis of economic stagnation similar to the one experienced by the country in 1977 and 1978, a crisis which affected at the time more than one Gulf country.

Local experts have begun to study the new phenomena, to explore its characteristics and to look for its causes. But it seems that they are still far from drawing up successful solutions to deal with the crisis or to at least curtail it, especially since many of these experts attribute the roots of this crisis to big gaps that still exist in the economic legislation and in the methods of investment.

It is well-known that the 1977-78 crisis resulted in large part from the then existing state of laxity in the banking sector and from a number of semi-fraudulent transactions conducted by the foreign banks which were remitting their local assets for investment abroad without any controls, in addition to the chaos in investments and to local speculation in real estate. These constituted at the time the most important aspects of the economic activity.

The issue of the banks was dealt with at the time by the Central Currency Bureau which set up the Bank Control Agency at the beginning of 1978. This agency continued its work with the transformation of the Currency Council into a central bank. Recently, this agency has begun, according to Central Bank Governor 'Abd-al-Malik al-Humr, to expand its activity by setting up an office concerned with banking risks.

The banks will cover the expenses of this new outfit which will not begin its work before the passage of several months while waiting for the completion of its organizational structure. This outfit will serve primarily the private commercial banks by supplying them with information on the positions of the clients and on their dealings with all the banks in the country. This information will give each bank a clear picture of the client's potentials. In other words, this outfit will be tantamount to a data bank supplying information on all clients, be they individuals or companies, in all parts of the country.

If the Bank Control Agency was set up at the time to control and improve the banking activity and to make sure that the banking operations conducted by the banks, especially foreign banks, in the country are serious, then the establishment of the Banking Risks Office seeks to protect banks from the "manipulation" of clients.

It has seemed recently that the UAE is in dire need of such an office, especially with the spread of the phenomenon of rubber checks--a phenomenon that has reached worrisome dimensions. Experts believe that this is not so much a "moral" manifestation as it is an indication of the presence of a fundamental flaw in the country's economic structure. Though this flaw has not yet reached the point of danger, it may do so quickly if not dealt with soon.

#### Rise in Rents and in [Cost of] Clothing

Observers attribute the recent crisis, which has begun to prevail in the country and which is characterized generally by the absence of any balance between individual incomes and expenses, to the sudden and rapid rise in the rent rates for housing and for business places. Such a rise in rent rates is unfamiliar in other countries and is due to the freedom which the landowner enjoys in raising rents whenever he wishes.

Samir al-Durubi, the general director of the Abu Dhabi Chamber of Commerce and Industry, has said that a stagnation similar to that prevailing in 1977 exists at present. Al-Durubi attributes this stagnation to the "enormous and endless rise in the rents of business places. This has brought about serious consequences, the most significant being that the merchant can no longer engage in his work normally."

Al-Durubi adds that the merchant "is compelled to cover the expenses of this item [rent] by raising his prices and by loading the commodity with an additional cost, other than the margin of profit, to be able as much as possible to pay the demanded rent on time. Despite this, many merchants cannot supply [the banks] with money to cover the value of the checks they have already issued to the landlords for the payment of their rent on dates already agreed upon because of the stagnation of their businesses and of the drop in their sales."

If merchants can raise the prices of their goods to face such situations, then the people with limited income, such as company employees and civil servants, are the ones who pay the heaviest price for these abnormal conditions. This has led numerous foreigners who work in the country and who are not citizens not to renew their contracts or to resign and return to their native countries because they are no longer capable of meeting the requirements and expenses of their daily life.

This counter immigration among foreigners has led to a shortage in the manpower working in the various fields of services to the degree that some fundamental public facilities, such as hospitals and other facilities, have come to experience a real shortage since the Arabs and foreigners working in them, even up to the level of specialized doctors and engineers, have begun to leave the country. The fact is that the demand for luxury commodities, a demand for which the Arab Gulf countries are famous, has dropped by a large degree. The majority of the residents, both citizens and foreigners, now purchase very essential goods only. This drop in the purchase rate has led, according to al-Durubi, to a drop in the currency liquidity and to the stagnation of numerous commodities.



The managers of some UAE banks demand that penalties be stiffened for those who give rubber checks, some of them second and third class business men and company owners. But the experts believe that the problem is actually much bigger than to be solved with this punitive approach because it is not an ethical problem concerning a small number of people with evil intent but a problem caused by a sudden crisis. Therefore, solutions must be found for the causes of the crisis and not for its consequences, even though it is acknowledged that there is a need to issue stiffer laws against those issuing rubber checks.

In fact, the experts attribute the causes of the crisis to the unbalanced investment, not only in the UAE but also in most of the Gulf states, and to "idle investment," as the manager of a bank operating in Abu Dhabi has said.

This idle investment covers two fundamental types: Investment, and at times even speculation, in foreign currencies and gold and investment in real estate construction.

The first type has its national and individual perils. On the one hand, it sends large sums of money abroad, thus causing this capital to be unproductive locally. Moreover, speculation (undertaken in the UAE by foreign firms that are not all of good reputation) may lead to enormous losses for individuals. This is what has actually happened and what has motivated the UAE Government to draft a special speculation law which has not been promulgated yet.

As for real estate, it is developed by capitalists who are less interested in ventures, who want their capital to stay "under their eyes" and who, at the same time, want to reap attractive profits by leasing their real estate for exorbitant rent.

These idle investments, and the inducement of quick profit they offer, have expanded as a result of the numerous negative experiences undergone by the conversion industry projects and by the consumer products industry financed by private local capital.

The truth is that a number of national investors had turned at a previous time toward setting up local light industries but faced serious difficulties, either because of the foreign imports with which it was impossible for them to compete or because the size of the market in which they were able to distribute their products was smaller than to be able to absorb their production, as well as the presence of other competing goods.

Muhammad Khalfan Khurbash, the head of the Investment Department of the UAE Ministry of Finance and Industry, asserts that idle investment has drained the state's financial resources and caused serious damage "at a time when there are no incentives to encourage these investors to invest locally in the agricultural and industrial sectors. The government must create such incentives within the framework of the Gulf economic integration so that these industries may realize the desired success."

Khurbash calls for the establishment of specialized agricultural and industrial banks similar to the Real Estate Bank by providing incentives similar to those given for investment in the real estate sector in order to avoid the idle investment.

Until such incentives are created and until plans are drawn up for the sectors in which the private capital can operate and realize reasonable profits, there seems to be no cures other than those imposed through socio-economic legislation that protects the Gulf citizens generally from the dangers of these sudden crises that crop up every now and then and that helps these citizens contribute to the development and enhancement of their countries with their savings, not just with the oil revenues. This will constitute the first step toward building a sound economy for the post-oil era.

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